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Guarantors of Our Genes: Are Egg Donors Liable for Latent Genetic
Disease
Abstract

Assisted reproductive technology ("ART"), including egg donation, is changing the topography of the
American family. Heated debates and legislative battles over cloning and stem cell research reveal the
complexity of the moral, scientific, and legal implications of emerging alternative reproductive methods. In
fact, the field of reproductive medicine is the "Wild West" of the healthcare world where technological
development is testing the boundaries of science and ethics. The legal and ethical issues intrinsic to the
evolution of the egg donation industry are poised to become central topics of public debate as we, as a culture,
reevaluate who and what constitutes a "parent" or "child," whether a human egg is a commodity, and what
privacy and medical confidentiality mean relative to the right to know one's genetic make-up. Largely
unregulated and untested in court, egg donation spawns a multitude of unanswered legal questions that will
inevitably begin to emerge sometime very soon. Litigation in this field is looming. For lack of precedent,
conclusions are reached by comparison to the analogous legal issues surrounding adoption, surrogacy, sperm
donation, and blood donation, as well as the social trends implied by tangential precedent. Section I reviews
the very limited history of litigation in which egg donation was a factor, the comparably scarce state and
federal regulation of egg donation, and the case and statutory law covering analogous legal topics. Part II.A
explores whether liability could attach under a product liability theory while Part II. B examines an egg
donor’s potential liability for latent genetic disease inherited by the egg donation child under a negligence
theory. Part III offers recommendations for regulating egg donation in order to prevent suits similar to those
described in the comment. The comment argues that the burden of care should rest on the fertility clinic
doctors and the egg donation agencies to properly screen egg donors.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Assisted reproductive technology (“ART”), including egg
2
3
donation, is changing the topography of the American family.
Heated debates and legislative battles over cloning and stem cell
research reveal the complexity of the moral, scientific, and legal
4
implications of emerging alternative reproductive methods. In fact,
the field of reproductive medicine is the “Wild West” of the
healthcare world where technological development is testing the
5
boundaries of science and ethics.
1. ART encompasses all asexual human reproduction, including in vitro
fertilization (“IVF”), sperm donation and artificial insemination (when coupled with
female fertility treatment), and others. It generally involves surgical removal of eggs
from the ovaries of an intending mother (the woman intending to raise an ART
child, see infra note 15 and accompanying text), or an egg donor, fertilization outside
the intending mother or surrogate’s womb with the intending father or sperm
donor’s sperm, and the implantation of the fertilized embryo(s) back into the womb
of the intending mother, or gestational surrogate, who then carries the fetus to term.
See infra note 2 (discussing egg donation procedures and IVF). See generally AM. SOC’Y
FOR REPROD. MED., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 3–
17 (2003) (explaining in vitro fertilization and other forms of ART that have become
accepted medical treatments for infertility).
A “traditional surrogacy” involves the insemination of a surrogate mother, not the
intending mother, using the surrogate’s own eggs to conceive a child for the
intending mother. A “gestational surrogate,” however, has no genetic relationship to
the child she births. Her pregnancy results from an in vitro fertilization implantation
using the intending mother or egg donor’s fertilized eggs. A surrogate surrenders
the child to the intending mother at its birth. See Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation,
Determination of Status as Legal or Natural Parents in Contested Surrogacy Births, 77
A.L.R.5TH 567, 574 (2000) (distinguishing the two types of surrogacy).
2. Human egg donation—also known as oocyte, female gamete, ovum, and ova
donation—involves the maturation of eggs in the donor using fertility drugs. The
eggs are then surgically removed from the donor’s ovaries through vaginal
aspiration, then fertilized in a lab, and resulting embryos are inserted into the
recipient or intending mother’s womb. The IVF procedure is this “test-tube”
fertilization and subsequent implantation of the eggs into the intending mother or
surrogate. Egg donation is thus the substitution of a donor’s eggs for the intending
mother’s eggs in an otherwise standard IVF procedure. See AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD.
MED., THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION (SPERM, EGG AND EMBRYO DONATION AND
SURROGACY): A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 3–9 (2006) (explaining the processes of egg
donation and embryo transfer in greater detail).
3. See Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation of
the Ideology of the Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 563 (2000) (discussing the conflict
between traditional notions of family and the realities of modern families, which are
frequently formed by elective reproduction).
4. See, e.g., Rachel Benson Gold, Embryonic Stem Cell Research: Old Controversy; New
Debate, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Oct. 2004, at 4 (noting that President
George W. Bush’s move to cut federal funding for embryonic stem cell research was
a compromise that left every side frustrated).
5. See LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE, at xviii (Alfred A. Knopf 2007)
(revealing that “[t]here is some truth” to the popular notion that those working in
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Our society is still in the adolescence—or even infancy—of ART.
The legal and ethical issues intrinsic to the evolution of the egg
donation industry are poised to become central topics of public
debate as we, as a culture, reevaluate who and what constitutes a
6
7
“parent” or “child,” whether a human egg is a commodity, and what
privacy and medical confidentiality mean relative to the right to know
8
one’s genetic make-up. Of course, arguments over reproduction are
not new for a country more than arguably still reeling from Roe v.
9
Wade, but the violent battles to be fought over emerging
reproductive technology may well overshadow those accompanying
10
the abortion issue.
11
Largely unregulated and untested in court, egg donation spawns a
multitude of unanswered legal questions that will inevitably begin to
emerge sometime very soon. Litigation in this field is looming. The
numbers alone make conflict inevitable: at least 8,075 egg donation
procedures resulting in live births were completed in the 1990s, and
12
those children are now at least preteens, if not young adults. As the
the field of ART are “rogue scientists and multimillionaire doctors willing to stuff
pretty much anything into a woman’s expensively prepped womb.”).
6. For a well articulated discussion of some of the parentage questions looming
larger as ART becomes more common, see id. at 20–21, listing some of the relevant
questions:
How much do genetic progenitors matter? Does a child who grows up
father-free—or any child conceived through donated sperm or egg—have
the right, or the need, to know the identity of the donor who helped bring
him into being? . . . Do they need to know the truth? Do they need to know
the donor?
7. See infra Part II.A (analyzing whether human eggs should be considered
commodities for the purpose of applying principles of product liability, tort and
contract law).
8. See Janet Leach Richards & Sheryl Wolf, Medical Confidentiality and Disclosure of
Paternity, 48 S.D. L. REV. 409, 427 (2003) (recognizing that “[t]he enactment of
legislation permitting adult adoptees to open their sealed adoption records indicates
a trend towards acknowledgement of a person’s right to know their biological makeup”). See generally Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution:
The Case for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150 (1999) (considering the
passage of statutes in several states that allow adult adoptees to obtain adoption
records upon request and without a judicial hearing).
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (controversially legalizing abortion).
10. See MUNDY, supra note 5, at xiv–xx, 19–23 (contrasting infertility treatment
with abortion because “the spectacle of someone trying to have a child can be even
more inflammatory than the spectacle of someone trying not to have one”).
11. See infra Section I.B–C (examining the judicial history relating to and
regulation of egg donation).
12. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention began publishing annual
reports in 1996, detailing the success rates of various ART procedures, under the
mandate of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992. 42 U.S.C.
§ 201 (1992). This statute requires fertility clinics to report ART data, which is
accumulated, analyzed and published in annual reports. 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1, 263a-5.
The number of live births from egg donation procedures is not well-documented;
the ART reports start at 1995 and not all fertility clinics have reported their success
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new generation of children conceived with eggs donated by
13
strangers matures, adult-onset diseases will begin to emerge and
cases will almost undoubtedly reach the courts seeking resolution of
who should bear the burden and the blame, and what degree of care
is owed to people who may be genetically related to you, but are most
14
definitely not in your family. Distinct from malpractice suits against
fertility doctors, egg donors will face potential liability for
imperfections passed through their genes because some parents of
15
egg donation children, known as intending or recipient parents, will
feel cheated by the donors from whom they “bought” eggs at great
16
expense. The children themselves will want and may need to know

rates. See infra Section I.C (discussing the lack of government regulation of fertility
clinics).
Nonetheless, even these approximations serve to demonstrate the
increasing importance of ART, and egg donation specifically. For further discussion
of ART procedures, including success rates and other statistics, see Assisted
Reproductive Technology: All Reports, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ARTReports.htm
(last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
13. Not all ovum donors are—or remain—anonymous, but the vast majority
choose not meet the recipient(s). E.g., Andrew W. Vorzimer, The Egg Donor and
Surrogacy Controversy: Legal Issues Surrounding Representation of Parties to an Egg Donor
and Surrogacy Contract, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 415, 427 (1999) (estimating that ninety
percent of egg donors are effectively anonymous). For a brief explanation of why
donors and recipients tend to prefer anonymity in egg donation transactions, see
Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001
BYU L. REV. 107, 116–17 (examining the complications interpersonal relationships
can create in such situations).
For a fascinating discussion of one woman’s extensive experience as an egg donor,
see generally JULIA DEREK, CONFESSIONS OF A SERIAL EGG DONOR (2004), in which the
author, who donated her eggs a total of twelve times, describes her motivations,
experiences and the psychological care required for her to distance herself from any
children born to recipient couples from her eggs.
14. By comparison, the first “generation” of children conceived through sperm
donation and artificial insemination are now reaching adulthood, and a significant
number are demanding information about their genetic fathers. See Paula J.
Manning, Baby Needs a New Set of Rules: Using Adoption Doctrine To Regulate Embryo
Donation, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 677, 679 (2004) (arguing that legislative reforms
granting children conceived with anonymously donated sperm the right to access
their genetic father’s medical information should be extended to children born
using anonymously donated embryos).
15. An intending couple or parent is the party that initiates the creation of a
child, including through surrogacy or egg donation, with the intention of assuming
legal responsibility for the child and raising it as their own. See generally Campbell,
supra note 1, at 567 (discussing the development of the “intent test” for determining
parentage in the era of ART).
16. Typical egg donation fees range between $5,000 and $7,000, but the full cost
of fertility treatment with IVF and donated eggs ranges between $10,000 and at least
$30,000. See infra Part II.A (exploring the potential liability arising out of the sizable
and controversial compensation ovum “donors” receive); see also Pamela D.
Bridgewater, Reconstructing Rationality:
Towards a Critical Economic Theory of
Reproduction, 56 EMORY L.J. 1215, 1225 (2007) (noting the “astronomical” out-ofpocket costs associated with egg donation, “rang[ing] from $7,000 to $20,000 per
cycle”).
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17

They may feel they should have been
who they are genetically.
warned, however many years have passed.
The issues raised in egg donor tort liability cases will be of first
impression in all jurisdictions, and they will include questions about
the rights and responsibilities egg donors owe their genetic offspring.
At least some of these cases will likely make it to trial. In anticipation,
this Comment seeks prospectively to answer the question of whether
an egg donor owes a continuing duty to warn such genetic offspring
if, after the birth of these children, she discovers she has a hereditary
18
genetic disease that may have passed down through her eggs. This
hypothetical—but inevitable—situation involves a child with a genetic
disease who is born from the egg of a donor who could not
reasonably have known she carried a predisposition to a genetic
19
disease until after the egg donation process. In short, the question
is whether egg donors are subject to a continuing duty to warn.

17. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Baines, Note, Gamete Donors and Mistaken Identities: The
Importance of Genetic Awareness and Proposals Favoring Donor Identity Disclosure for
Children Born from Gamete Donations in the United States, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 116, 118–19
(2007) (asserting the medical and psychological reasons why a child born through
sperm, egg or embryo donation should have access to his genetic history); Pino
D’Orazio, Note, Half of the Family Tree: A Call for Access to a Full Genetic History for
Children Born by Artificial Insemination, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 249, 253 (2006)
(arguing for children’s access to their sperm donor’s genetic history because of the
importance of having such information when making health decisions); Amy Shelf,
Note, A Need To Know Basis: Record Keeping, Information Access, and the Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Act, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1047, 1047–48 (2000) (arguing for
an offspring-oriented approach, based on the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act, for regulating access to donors’ genetic information by children
conceived through ART).
18. For a compendious discussion of genetic diseases, transmission and testing,
see Sonia M. Suter, Note, Whose Genes Are These Anyway?: Familial Conflicts over Access
to Genetic Information, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1886–87 (1993) (analyzing the
competing interests that may arise when a family member is diagnosed with a genetic
disease, because the other family members may or may not want to be informed, but
noting that the patient himself should not lose his right to medical confidentiality).
19. The hypothetical, prospective problem analyzed in this Comment can be
expressed in narrative form:
In 2001, a twenty year-old girl in apparently perfect health entered into
an anonymous egg donation contract with a recipient couple who, after
eight years of marriage, had failed to conceive. As per the egg donation
agency’s procedure, the girl was matched with the couple after providing
multiple photographs of herself and her immediate family, submitting a
personal statement, completing a psychological profiling test, and compiling
brief medical histories of herself and her parents, siblings and grandparents.
The donor and the recipient couple chose never to meet, and the contract’s
provisions reinforced this choice.
The donor then underwent a
gynecological exam, and blood tests for sexually transmitted diseases, but no
tests were conducted to discover latent genetic disorders. The donor’s
“donation cycle” and surgery were successful, and nine months later, the wife
bore a child conceived with one of the donated eggs and her own husband’s
sperm. The egg donor was never informed of the successful birth.
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The answer, developed in detail below, is that it is unlikely liability
would attach to the egg donor for latent genetic disorders she passed
down to the egg donation child, either under a product liability or
negligence theory, though the possibility warrants preemptive
regulation. For lack of precedent, conclusions are reached by
comparison to the analogous legal issues surrounding adoption,
surrogacy, sperm donation, and blood donation, as well as the social
trends implied by tangential precedent. Section I reviews the very
limited history of litigation in which egg donation was a factor, the
comparably scarce state and federal regulation of egg donation, and
the case and statutory law covering analogous legal topics.
Part II.A explores whether liability could attach under a product
20
liability theory. Egg donation transactions are generally considered
21
renditions of services, not sales of goods, but the sizeable
compensation egg “donors” receive makes this classification
22
controversial.
Even so, the impossibility of guaranteeing genetic

In 2009, eight years later, the former egg donor is diagnosed with adultonset diabetes (type II diabetes), a condition she was genetically predisposed
toward developing. Her children will inherit this predisposition. The donor
never notifies the recipient couple because she has no knowledge of or
relationship with them. The same is true of the egg donation child, whom
she does not know even exists. Fifteen years after this diagnosis, the child,
born to the recipient couple with the donor’s egg, is now twenty-three and is
diagnosed with the same disease. After contacting the egg donation agency
and fertility clinic that helped bring him to life, the child eventually learns of
the egg donor’s diabetes. The child sues his genetic mother, the donor,
claiming she breached a duty to warn him of the inheritable disease that he
could otherwise have prevented.
20. Cf. Megan D. McIntyre, Comment, The Potential for Products Liability Actions
when Artificial Insemination by an Anonymous Donor Produces Children with Genetic Defects,
98 DICK. L. REV. 519, 519 (1993) (analyzing whether sperm donors are liable under a
product liability theory for genetic defects passed to their genetic offspring through
their anonymously donated sperm).
21. But see Jay A. Soled, The Sale of Donors’ Eggs: A Case Study of Why Congress Must
Modify the Capital Asset Definition, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919, 919 (1999) (arguing that
human eggs are commodities, so payment to egg donors is for purchase of property
rather than services rendered, and thus that egg donation transactions fit squarely
within the definition of “capital asset” under the Internal Revenue Code).
22. See infra Part II.A (analyzing whether egg donation could fall under a product
liability scheme based on the tremendous amounts of money intending parents pay
donors). Compare Andrew Wancata, Note, No Value for a Pound of Flesh: Extending
Market-Inalienability of the Human Body, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 221 (2003–2004)
(“[S]perm and ova have become market commodities, reaching bids from
prospective purchasers as high as $15,000 and $50,000, respectively.”), with Ethics
Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., ASRM Ethics Committee Report: Financial
Compensation of Oocyte Donors, 8 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 305–09 (2007) [hereinafter
Ethics Comm., Compensation] (describing the variety of compensation schemes, and
recognizing that the pain, discomfort and time commitment experienced by egg
donors justify and render ethical any compensation under $5,000, but nothing over
$10,000).
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outcomes and the public policy against “baby-selling” will likely
prevent successful application of a product liability theory to a civil
suit against an egg donor for failing to warn.
Part II.B examines an egg donor’s potential liability for latent
genetic disease inherited by the egg donation child under a
negligence theory. While genetic “parentage” may well create a
legally relevant relationship between the donor and the child, both
24
the law’s preference for traditional family structures and the best
25
interests of the child suggest the donor should not be held to an
ongoing duty to warn.
Part III offers recommendations for regulating egg donation in
order to prevent suits similar to the one discussed here. Currently,
the industry is almost completely unregulated and the level of donor
26
screening is frequently low. Instead of imposing liability on the egg
donors, this Comment argues the burden of care should rest on the
fertility clinic doctors and the egg donation agencies to properly
screen egg donors.

23. See infra Part II.A (defining “baby-selling” as the feared commodification of
children). This prohibition on selling babies is a broad bar on profiting from the
legal transfer of children, encompassing adoption, surrogacy and other activities.
See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (explaining that traditional
surrogacy agreements violate the public policy against selling children because
payment is exchanged for ownership of the child). Kentucky’s statute is illustrative:
A person, agency, institution, or intermediary shall not be a party to a
contract or agreement which would compensate a woman for her artificial
insemination and subsequent termination of parental rights to a child born
as a result of that artificial insemination. . . . Contracts or agreements
entered into in violation of this subsection shall be void.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (West 2007).
24. See generally Dolgin, supra note 3, at 527–42 (arguing that case law reveals the
law’s general preference for maintaining traditional family structures, even if doing
so requires subjugation of traditional biological—birth—notions of motherhood).
25. This standard is used in adoption proceedings and surrogacy custody suits.
See, e.g., Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1246–48 (invalidating a surrogacy contract because a
child’s best interests are not served by prenatal determination of custody).
26. Although egg donors are generally tested for communicable and sexually
transmitted diseases through blood tests and ultrasound examinations, genetic
testing to uncover latent diseases is rare. See ADVISORY GROUP ON ASSISTED REPROD.
TECHS., N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & LAW, THINKING OF BECOMING AN EGG
DONOR?
GET THE FACTS BEFORE YOU DECIDE! 8–9 (2002), available at
http://www.health.state.ny.us/community/reproductive_health/infertility/docs/11
27.pdf [hereinafter ADVISORY GROUP, GET THE FACTS] (explaining the industry
standards for egg donor screening in New York State, indicating that most tests are
discretionary, and noting that egg donation agencies rely a great deal on the
prospective donor’s answers to general family medical history questions). These
basic tests are the minimum required by the Food and Drug Administration.
21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.75, 1271.80 (2007).
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BACKGROUND: EGG DONATION AT LAW AND RELATED LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS
A. A Brief History of Egg Donation
27

The first successful in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) procedure was
28
completed in 1978. Almost thirty years later, in 2006, the world’s
29
three millionth IVF child was born. Egg donation is the substitution
of a different woman’s eggs to be fertilized and implanted in the
30
intending mother, and is thus an outgrowth of IVF. Based on data
from the eighty-nine percent of registered American fertility clinics
that reported their 2004 data, one percent of all children born in the
United States in 2004 were conceived through ART, totaling 49,458
31
ART children born, of which 6,653 were conceived with donated
32
eggs.
More recent statistics are not yet compiled, but with one in seven
33
U.S. women predicted to experience infertility, the number of
children conceived through egg donation is likely to continue
growing at startling rates. As our society struggles to keep pace with
reproductive technology, our courts will increasingly be called upon
to resolve emerging disputes.
B. Egg Donation in the Courts
Egg donation, despite its increasing prevalence, has rarely featured
in court except in a few custody disputes arising out of breaches of
gestational surrogacy contracts. Seminally, in 1993, the California
Supreme Court wrestled with alternative reproduction in Johnson v.
34
Calvert, in which it confronted the question of whether a genetic

27. See supra notes 1–2 (describing the role of IVF in ART).
28. MUNDY, supra note 5, at 7.
29. Press Release, Eur. Soc’y of Human Reprod. & Embryology, Three Million
Babies Born Using Assisted Reproductive Technologies (2006) (on file with the
American University Law Review).
30. See supra note 2 (describing the egg donation process in detail).
31. Victoria Clay Wright, Jeani Change, Gary Jeng, Michael Chen & Maurizio
Macaluso, Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance—United States, 2004, MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP., June 8, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/
preview/mmwrhtml/ss5606a1.htm.
32. Id.
33. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 1996 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 1
(1998) [hereinafter CDC, SUCCESS RATES] (finding that fifteen percent of U.S.
women of childbearing age had received infertility treatment as of 1996). But see
MUNDY, supra note 5, at 12 (“About 12 percent of women—7.3 million in 2002—find
themselves unable to conceive or bring to term children they want.”).
34. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
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35

relationship trumps a biological one. The court was asked whether
a gestational surrogate is the “natural mother” of a child conceived
with the egg and sperm of the intending parents, a situation in which
36
the child is genetically unrelated to its birth mother. Shortly before
the birth, the gestational surrogate threatened to keep the child if
she was not paid the remaining balance owed to her on the surrogacy
37
contract. Both sides then filed suits seeking recognition of their
38
lawful parentage over the unborn child.
Finding for the intending parents, the court refused to hold the
39
child had two mothers, though both women had a cognizable claim
40
It also denied that the Uniform Parentage Act
to motherhood.
41
(“UPA”) of 1973, enacted to replace the traditional notion of
illegitimacy with a legal definition of “parent” based on the parent42
child relationship, was not intended to govern surrogacy disputes.
So, looking to the parental relationships at play, the court held that
when consanguinity and giving birth “do not coincide in one woman,
she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended
to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her
43
own—is the natural mother.”
In a footnote, the Johnson court applied its holding to egg donation
situations, concluding that “in a true ‘egg donation’ situation, where
a woman gestates and gives birth to a child formed from the egg of

35. Id. (“Anna [the gestational surrogate], of course, predicates her claim of
maternity on the fact that she gave birth to the child. The Calverts [the intending
parents] contend that Crispina’s genetic relationship to the child establishes that she
is his mother.”). A biological relationship is established by birth, whereas genes
establish a genetic relationship. See id. at 778 (explaining that while Anna bore the
child, blood tests excluded her as the genetic mother).
36. Id. at 777–78.
37. Id. at 778.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 781 n.8 (noting that the gestational surrogate had little contact with the
family, and declining to recognize parental rights for the “third party” gestational
surrogate because to recognize such parental rights “would diminish Crispina
[Calvert]’s role as a mother”).
40. Id. at 781–82 (interpreting the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 to recognize
both birth and blood relationships as proof of motherhood, and reasoning that
“[b]ecause two women each have presented acceptable proof of maternity, we do not
believe this case can be decided without enquiring into the parties’ intentions as
manifested in the surrogacy agreement”).
41 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 1–30 (1973) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 386–505
(2001).
42. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779.
43. Id. at 782. But see Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially A Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 429, 429 (2007) (arguing that defining motherhood by contract or
genetics denigrates gestation, and that a gestation-oriented approach to determining
maternity would produce better results and be more in line with constitutional
precedent).
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another woman with the intent to raise the child as her own, the birth
44
mother is the natural mother under California law.”
Directly ruling on parentage in an egg donation case in McDonald
45
v. McDonald, a New York appellate court reached the conclusion
46
There, a father sought sole
proposed by the Johnson footnote.
custody of IVF twins conceived with his sperm and anonymously
47
donated eggs, and birthed by his soon-to-be ex-wife. He argued that
48
he was the only parent with a genetic relationship to the children.
The court struggled to decide whether the wife, who was both the
intending and biological mother but who had no genetic relationship
49
to the children, could be a mother under New York law. Relying on
the reasoning in Johnson, the court found the wife to be the lawful
50
mother.
More recently, both the California and United States Supreme
51
Courts denied certiorari in In re Marriage of Buzzanca, in which the
child was the product of both anonymous sperm and egg donors, and
was implanted as an IVF embryo into a third-party gestational
surrogate pursuant to the contract between the surrogate and the
52
intending parents. The intending parents’ marriage dissolved while
the surrogate was pregnant, and the husband sought to evade child

44. 851 P.2d at 782 n.10. For an example of an non-“true ‘egg donation’
situation,” see K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005), which held:
A woman who supplies ova to be used to impregnate her lesbian partner,
with the understanding that the resulting child will be raised in their joint
home, cannot waive her responsibility to support that child. Nor can such a
purported waiver effectively cause that woman to relinquish her parental
rights.
Id. at 682.
For a critique of that holding, see Heather A. Crews, Recent Development, Women
Be Warned, Egg Donation Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up To Be: The Copulation of Science and the
Courts Makes Multiple Mommies, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 141 (2005). Crews argues the
distinction between an egg donor and a “provider” of eggs is
arbitrary and weakens the protections given to egg donors and recipients
through legislation . . . . [It] allows not only the opportunity for future
donors to assert parental rights over children created with their eggs, but
also allows individuals who conceive with donated eggs to impart maternal
responsibilities to the donor above and beyond those agreed on at the time
of conception.
Id. at 154.
45. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
46. Id. at 480 (“[W]e have a true ‘egg donation’ situation, and we find the
reasoning of the Supreme Court of California on this issue to be persuasive.”).
47. Id. at 478–79.
48. Id. at 479.
49. Id. at 478.
50. Id. at 478, 480.
51. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998), review denied, No. S069696, 1998 Cal.
LEXIS 3830 (Cal. June 10, 1998), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 902 (1980).
52. Id. at 282.
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support payments by arguing that he was not the father. The trial
court concluded that the baby had no lawful parents because no
54
party was sufficiently related to it. The appellate court found that
55
conclusion “extraordinary.”
In reversing, it held that the child
would never have been conceived but for the intent of the intending
parents, who were thus the lawful parents, despite their lack of either
56
a genetic or biological relationship to the child.
57
Similar cases have been litigated, as have medical malpractice
58
suits against fertility doctors and clinics, but an egg donor’s liability
for failing to warn of subsequently discovered genetic disease has yet
to be heard in court.
C. Regulation of Egg Donation
The legal parameters of assisted reproduction present a vast and
unexplored frontier into which only the model Uniform Parentage
59
Act, discussed below, has ventured.
Egg donation is generally
60
unregulated, and the liability of egg donors themselves is completely
61
62
unregulated. There is no relevant federal regulation, and the few

53. Id. at 282–83.
54. Id. at 282.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See generally Campbell, supra note 1 (discussing cases in which determinations
of parentage are complicated by assisted reproductive technology, and specifically
surrogacy).
58. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted
Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 7 (2004) (discussing the possible physical harm
caused to children conceived and born through ART, due to increased likelihood of
twins and other multiples, potential transmission of diseases from donors, and
complications from low birth weight); Fred Norton, Note, Assisted Reproduction and the
Frustration of Genetic Affinity: Interest, Injury, and Damages, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 795
(1999) (describing the psychological injury caused when gametes are negligently
used to fertilize or impregnate the wrong eggs or woman or are stolen and
fraudulently used for that purpose).
59. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 1–30 (1973) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 386–505
(2001).
60. See Alexander N. Hecht, Comment and Note, The Wild Wild West: Inadequate
Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 227, 227–29
(2001) (exploring the lack of regulation of the fertility industry, underlying reasons
for that dearth, and the need for legislation to address the issue).
61. See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 4 n.4 (C.P. Eerie County 2004)
(noting that most state legislatures have not addressed egg donation because it is a
relatively new procedure).
62. See Laura M. Katers, Comment, Arguing the “Obvious” in Wisconsin: Why State
Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology Has Not Come To Pass, and How It Should,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 441, 443–44 (describing the general lack of comprehensive
regulation, including at the federal level, of ART). The only federal regulation
directly affecting the egg donation industry is the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certification Act of 1992, but it only requires medical clinics engaged in the business
of ART to annually report their success rates per each type of ART procedure to the
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states with statutes even mentioning egg donation—California,
Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, and New York—only regulate artificial
63
insemination, sperm donation, or surrogacy agreements.
Adopted in pertinent part in eighteen states, the model Uniform
Parentage Act of 1973, promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”), proposed a
modern approach to legitimacy and paternity based upon parent64
child relationships instead of the marital status of the parents. The
1973 UPA suggested evidentiary standards for determining paternity,
65
but it did not address issues arising from egg donation.

Centers for Disease Control. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7 (1992).
The United States does prohibit payment for human organs under the National
Organ Transplant Act, which levies sanctions upon any person who knowingly
acquires, receives or transfers a human organ for payment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–274(e)
(2006). However, “organ” is narrowly defined and does not include gametes, so the
prohibition on buying and selling human organs does not apply to human eggs. See,
e.g., Margaret R. Sobota, Note, The Price of Life: $50,000 for an Egg, Why Not $1,500 for
a Kidney? An Argument To Establish a Market for Organ Procurement Similar to the Current
Market for Human Egg Procurement, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1225, 1243 n.135 (2004)
(discussing the disparate legal treatment of egg donation compared to organ
donation and advocating for a free market approach to regulating organ donation
because of the likelihood of increased social and economic efficiency and utility).
63. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. § 63.213 (2003); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 47/1 (2003); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–124 (McKinney 2008).
Louisiana is the only state in America that directly regulates egg donation, rather
than the parentage of children resulting from ART procedures. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:122 (2000). The Louisiana statute flatly prohibits “[t]he sale of a human ovum,
fertilized human ovum, or human embryo.” Id. The underlying policy is recognition
of embryos as people and the establishment of appropriate guidelines for their
handling and storage. See John Bologna Krentel, The Louisiana “Human Embryo”
Statute Revisited: Reasonable Recognition and Protection for the In Vitro Fertilized Ovum,
45 LOY. L. REV. 239, 241 (1999) (arguing that the Louisiana statute is
groundbreaking and should be followed by other states because of its recognition of
the human life in embryos). No prosecutions under the statute have been filed.
Sobota, supra note 62, at 1243.
64. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 (1973) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 390 (2001)
(“The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every
parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.”). Alabama, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and
Wyoming have each adopted the 1973 UPA in pertinent part. 9B Uniform Laws
Annotated 377 tbl. (master ed., West Publ’g Co. 2001) (1968); see also Kira
Horstmeyer, Note, Putting Your Eggs in Someone Else’s Basket: Inserting Uniformity into
the Uniform Parentage Act’s Treatment of Assisted Reproduction, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
671, 684–91 (2007) (categorizing the five types of state statutes governing sperm and
egg donation, and including Kansas, Missouri, Connecticut, and Idaho as states that
follow the 1973 UPA, at least in effect).
65. See, e.g., Horstmeyer, supra note 64, at 685 (noting that the UPA of 1973
“fail[s] to address the problem of egg donation, likely because [it was] enacted at a
time when the technology for most egg donation assisted reproductive procedures
was not then feasible”).
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Recognizing the inadequacies of the 1973 UPA, the NCCUSL
revised it in 2002 to include provisions covering egg and sperm
66
donation situations. The new, gender-neutral UPA provides:
If a child is conceived as the result of assisted reproduction, this
section clarifies that a donor (whether of sperm or egg) is not a
parent of the resulting child. The donor can neither sue to
establish parental rights, nor be sued and required to support the
resulting child. In sum, donors are eliminated from the parental
67
equation.

In its own words, “the new [model] Act makes a policy decision to
68
clearly exclude the egg donor from claiming maternity.”
However, though it is significantly better suited to govern the
intricacies of modern reproduction, even the revised UPA has little
practical use in litigation in which egg donation is a factor. Only four
69
states have adopted the revision, and it lacks a provision discussing
the liability of donors who transmit diseases, viral or genetic, either
through fraud or negligence, or because they are uninformed. As
such, the UPA leaves unanswered the question of an egg donor’s
liability toward her genetic offspring.
D. Related Developments at Law
As so little concerning egg donation has been determined, which
direction the law will take as it struggles with these myriad new legal
issues can only be analyzed by analogy to tangential and related
issues. The most useful of these relevant fields are surrogacy,
adoption, and sperm and blood donation. The law’s handling of
each, in turn, may foreshadow comparable treatment of cases
involving egg donors’ liability concerning the genetic make-up of
their eggs.

66. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT arts. 7–8 (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355–70
(2001 & Supp. 2008), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/
final2002.pdf (reproducing the full text of the updated 2002 UPA, including
commentary by the issuing NCCUSL).
67. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355
(2001). The UPA explicitly states: “A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by
means of assisted reproduction.” Id. § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355.
68. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 cmt. (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 51
(Supp. 2008).
69. See Meghan Anderson, Comment and Casenote, K.M v. E.G.: Blurring the
Lines of Parentage in the Modern Courts, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 275, 279 n.41 (noting that
only Delaware, Texas, Washington and Wyoming have adopted the revised version).
Cf. Horstmeyer, supra note 64, at 687 (comparing the 2002 UPA with a Colorado
statute).
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1.

Surrogacy: Regulation and case law
Surrogacy necessarily involves multiple “mothers,” so it is useful for
70
comparison with egg donation, which also muddles legal parentage.
Surrogacy is the most regulated ART, in part because of the fallout
71
from In re Baby M, an infamous 1988 custody dispute arising from a
traditional surrogacy agreement (the surrogate was artificially
72
inseminated by the intending husband’s sperm). For $10,000, the
surrogate was to surrender the child at his birth to the intending
73
parents, but she refused to relinquish the baby. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, considering the child’s best interests, granted
custody to the intending parents, but invalidated the surrogacy
contract as a violation of the public policy prohibition against baby74
selling, codified in all adoption statutes. In accord, some states still
75
consider paid surrogacy agreements to be criminal. Other states
require that surrogacy contracts, though lawful, be careful not to
76
cross the line into baby-selling.
77
In Stiver v. Parker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the relationship between a surrogacy broker (which
is akin to an egg donation agency) and the surrogate is sufficiently
“special” to create an affirmative duty to protect the children born
78
through the process. Accidentally, the surrogacy agency’s doctors
impregnated the surrogate with her own husband’s sperm instead of
the intending father’s, and the child was born with hereditary
79
cytomegalic inclusion disease. The surrogate sued the agency for
70. However, for analysis of an egg donor’s liability for failing to warn her
genetic offspring, surrogacy is only marginally useful because gestational surrogates
have no genetic relationship to children they birth, so there is no possibility of
genetic disease transferring to offspring.
71. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
72. See, e.g., Katers, supra note 62, at 454–59 (discussing Wisconsin’s legislative
reaction to In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988)).
73. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1227, 1235–37.
74. Id. at 1240. See generally Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In
the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 67–70 (analyzing the market
mechanisms that brought the infertile intending parents and the surrogate
together).
75. E.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 122–123 (McKinney 2008) (“Surrogate parenting
contracts are hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void
and unenforceable.”).
76. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.213 (2003) (“A preplanned adoption agreement shall not
contain any provision . . . [t]o reduce any amount paid to the volunteer mother if the
child is stillborn or is born alive but impaired, or to provide for the payment of a
supplement or bonus for any reason.”).
77. 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that a special relationship giving rise to
a fiduciary duty of care exists between a surrogacy broker and the intending mother,
husband and intended child).
78. Id. at 272.
79. Id. at 263.

2008]

GUARANTORS OF OUR GENES

419

negligence, and the Sixth Circuit held the agency did owe the
surrogate a duty of care because of the special relationship the
80
surrogacy process created between the parties. The factors giving
rise to an affirmative duty of care included the agency’s commercial
profit, its doctors and lawyers’ professional status and control of
contract terms, and the fact that the other parties entrusted
81
themselves into the surrogacy agency’s care.
2.

Adoption: Regulation and case law
Adoption is useful for comparison with egg donation because an
adopted child, or adoptee, is genetically related to the “donating”
parent, but the intending parent assumes all legal and parental rights
82
and duties.
Unlike egg donation, adoption is fully regulated by
statutes that generally prioritize the best interests of the child by
clearly establishing the adopter as the legal parent in order to create
83
the stability and security of a normal parent-child relationship.
Notwithstanding the severance of all legal relationship between an
adoptee and his birth parents, many states recognize an adoptee’s
need for access to his adoption records in certain situations, provided
84
the birth parent’s privacy is protected. Different mechanisms exist
for balancing these two conflicting interests, including mutual
consent registries, confidential intermediary systems, and open
80. Id. at 272.
81. Id. at 271–72.
82. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15 (LexisNexis 2007) (mandating the
complete termination of all legal relationships between the adoptee’s biological
parents and the intending, adopting parents).
83. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 14, at 711–16 (discussing two requirements for
adoption: parents seeking to adopt must be fit and the adoptee is entitled to stability
through clear legal parentage determinations); see also Michelle L. Anderson,
Comment, Are You My Mommy?: A Call for Regulation of Embryo Donation, 35 CAP. U. L.
REV. 589, 610–11 (2006) (describing the concern for the adoptee’s “[r]ight to a
[c]lear [d]etermination of [p]arental [r]ights and [r]esponsibilities” manifested in
adoption statutes through the severance of all legal relationship between the adoptee
and his biological parents, and arguing that such a clear determination is necessary
in assisted reproduction situations).
For example, the Georgia adoption statute provides:
[A]doption terminates all legal relationships between the adopted individual
and his relatives, including his parent, so that the adopted individual
thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes . . . [and]
creates the relationship of parent and child between each petitioner and the
adopted individual, as if the adopted individual were a child of biological
issue of that petitioner. The adopted individual shall enjoy every right and
privilege of a biological child of that petitioner; shall be deemed a biological
child of that petitioner . . . .
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19(a)(1)–(2) (2007).
84. See Richards & Wolf, supra note 8, at 424 n.70 (listing various examples of
state statutes permitting and restricting adoptees’ access to the medical information
of their biological parents).

420

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:405

85

records. However, only four states allow an adoptee, upon reaching
majority, to access his adoption records upon request without a
86
More commonly, an adoptee must show good
judicial hearing.
87
cause to be granted such access. For example, a Missouri appellate
court refused to open the adoption records for an adult plaintiff
suffering from leukemia who sought a match for a bone marrow
88
transplant. Despite the urgency of his need, the court denied him
access to his biological father’s identity and medical information
because the improbability of finding a viable match outweighed any
89
benefit to be gained from disclosure.
The liability of adoption agencies, which serve an equivalent
function to egg donation agencies, has been considered, and many
statutes and courts indemnify them except in instances of gross
90
negligence or fraudulent misrepresentation. In keeping with this
91
policy, in Olson v. Children’s Home Society of California, biological
parents who had given up their first son for adoption unsuccessfully
sued the adoption agency for negligence after their second son died

85. See Cahn & Singer, supra note 8, at 162–68 (describing the various
approaches used by states to open adoption records and the medical information of
biological parents for adoptees).
86. ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.502 (2005); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (2007); see also Cahn & Singer, supra note 8, at 167 (Alaska and
Kansas).
87. See Richards & Wolf, supra note 8, at 424 n.70 (listing various examples of
state statutes permitting and restricting adoptees’ access to the medical information
of their biological parents, including provisions requiring necessity or show of good
cause).
88. In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
89. Id. at 621–23 (balancing “the factual need and the policy against disclosure”);
see also Sandra L.G. v. Bouchey, 576 N.Y.S.2d 767, 769 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991)
(refraining from reaching past legislative guidelines to open adoption records
because “it is of great concern . . . that any exercise of discretion beyond that
mandated by the Legislature will be governed by clear, consistent and effective
principles. They must be clear and consistent so that attorneys and others involved
in the adoption process can well explain the rules governing confidentiality to the
parents and subsequently to the children over the course of a lifetime, if necessary.
They must be effective so that any disclosure will pose only a demonstrable physical
benefit to the person seeking access as opposed to gratuitous obtaining of
emotionally charged information”).
90. Compare Burr v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986)
(allowing recovery by adopting parents when the adoption agency fraudulently
misrepresented the adoptee’s health), with MacMath v. Me. Adoption Placement
Servs., 635 A.2d 359 (Me. 1993) (refusing to hold adoption agencies to be guarantors
of the adoptee’s health absent a fiduciary duty to disclose information to the
intending parents), and Ann Marie N. v. City of S.F., 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
2463, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding for the adoption agency against the
adopting mother of an HIV positive baby because, in California, adoption agencies
are not liable for mere negligence in providing health information about prospective
adoptees).
91. 252 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Ct. App. 1988).
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92

The parents claimed the agency was
of a genetic disease.
responsible for the death because it had not informed them their first
son died of the same disease after being adopted, and, had they
known, they could have timely treated the second son or not
93
In rejecting the parents’ argument, the court
conceived again.
found no special relationship between the agency and the biological
94
parents that would create an ongoing duty to warn.
3.

Sperm Donation: Regulation and case law
Given simple but fundamental similarities between sperm and egg
donation, the former offers a very comparable template for analyzing
95
egg donation. The sperm donation-artificial insemination process is
the creation of a child using the gamete of a paid anonymous donor
who is chosen on the basis of his photo and a description of his
96
general interests and health, and with little regulatory oversight.
A sperm donor generally has no relationship at all with children
97
conceived artificially with his sperm, and in some states he is barred
98
by statute from asserting any parental rights. However, though still a
small minority trend, the status of sperm donors is becoming

92. Id. at 11.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 13.
95. The most important difference between egg donation and sperm donation is
the very invasive procedures involved in the former compared to the minute time
and effort demands of the latter. This is an important difference when determining
the liability of the sperm donor compared to the egg donor, because a sperm donor
does not develop a doctor-patient relationship with fertility doctors or donation
agencies and is thus not entitled to medical confidentiality. See infra Part II.B.
96. See, e.g., Katers, supra note 62, at 452–54 (discussing the limit of Wisconsin’s
regulation of artificial insemination and possible reasons why no further legislation
has been enacted).
97. But cf. In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (reversing the lower court’s
decision against the biological father of a child conceived through sperm donation
who sought parental rights over the child, because the father and mother knew each
other and might have agreed not to extinguish the sperm donor’s parental rights,
and therefore the donor might be the lawful father of the child, despite Colorado’s
artificial insemination statute).
98. A typical example of state regulation of sperm donation is New Jersey’s
adoption of the UPA:
Unless the donor of semen and the woman have entered into a written
contract to the contrary, the donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the
donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the father of a child thereby
conceived and shall have no rights or duties stemming from the
conception . . . .
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 2007); see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (Deering
2007) (adopting the UPA’s presumption of paternity in favor of the husband when
the wife is inseminated with a third party’s donated sperm, if the insemination is
conducted with the husband’s consent and through a licensed physician).
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murkier, both socially and legally, as a few recent cases have
imposed child support payments on sperm donors who were known
100
to the women artificially inseminated with their sperm.
Relevant for analysis of the hypothetical egg donation case at issue
in this Comment, there has been limited litigation over liability for
transmission of genetic disorders to children conceived with donated
101
102
In Johnson v. California Cryobank, Inc., an appellate court
sperm.
adjudicated a negligence and fraud suit against a sperm bank that
misrepresented to recipient parents the known medical history of a
sperm donor who had an extensive family history of genetic kidney
103
The resulting child had acute kidney disease that her
disease.
104
mother could not have transmitted to her. The suit became a battle
105
over donor anonymity when the parents tried to obtain proof of the
99. Socially, mechanisms are developing to allow children conceived with
donated sperm (or eggs) to connect with their genetic siblings or parents. Cf. Amy
Harmon, Sperm Donor Father Ends His Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at A18
(describing one former sperm donor’s decision to find and meet his genetic
offspring, through the Donor Sibling Registry, after reading a newspaper article
about the children’s search for each other). Founded in 2001, The Donor Sibling
Registry “assist[s] individuals conceived as a result of sperm, egg or embryo donation
that are seeking to make mutually desired contact with others with whom they share
genetic ties.” The Donor Sibling Registry, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/
about.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2008). The site describes its mission as facilitating
connections in “unchartered territory.” The Donor Sibling Registry, Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/FaqPage.php (last visited
Oct. 3, 2008).
100. See, e.g., Ferguson v. McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (holding
a former lover of the mother who agreed to donate sperm to her to be the lawful
father, and thus responsible for child support, even though the mother had
promised he would have no parental duties or responsibilities and lied about being
married, because the best interests of the children make such a promise
unenforceable), vacated, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007). See generally Karen De Haan,
Note, Whose Child Am I?: A Look at How Consent Affects a Husband’s Obligation To
Support a Child Conceived Through Heterologous Artificial Insemination, 37 BRANDEIS L.J.
809, 809 (1998) (discussing the regulation of husbands’ duties owed to the children
of their wives who are conceived through artificial insemination using a third party’s
sperm, and are thus genetically and biologically unrelated to the husband); Jason
Miller, Sperm Donor Indispensable Party To Support Proceedings, 9 LAW J. 2, 2 (2007)
(discussing Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), which found that
a sperm donor was indispensable to a proceeding to determine the custody of
children born to a lesbian couple who conceived through artificial insemination with
his sperm).
101. E.g., Johnson v. Cal. Cryobank, Inc., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Ct. App. 2000)
(ordering disclosure by a sperm bank of a sperm donor’s medical records, but
keeping his identity protected, in a suit by the parents of a child conceived with the
sperm of the anonymous donor who had a family history of kidney disease that was
not disclosed by the sperm bank).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 867.
104. Id. at 868.
105. The issue of donor anonymity, with respect to egg donation contracts that
sever all legal and social ties between the donor and any resulting children, is
discussed infra Part II.B.
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The court found the
sperm bank’s fraudulent misrepresentation.
doctor-patient privilege inapplicable to the sperm donor’s situation
because, as the donor’s only contact with the sperm bank was to sell
107
The court further found the
his sperm, he was not a “patient.”
absolute anonymity agreement signed by all parties to be
unenforceable as a matter of public policy because sperm donation
children might need access to their medical history in order to treat
108
medical conditions.
4.

Blood Donation: Regulation and case law
Comparable to genetic disease passed through donated eggs, blood
donors can carry viruses that are transmitted to patients through
109
110
Since the outbreak of AIDS, this risk has
blood transfusions.
111
received considerable attention.
Blood is an exception to a prohibition on the sale of human organs
112
The underlying policy is protection of the great
and tissue.
113
national need for blood for medical use. To protect blood supply,
most states have “blood shield statutes,” enacted in response to suits
brought by patients infected with contaminated blood, that classify

106. Cryobank, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869–70.
107. Id. at 872.
108. Id. at 875.
109. See, e.g., McKee v. Cutter Labs., Inc., 866 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding
summary judgment for the defendant blood product manufacturer whose product
infected the plaintiff with AIDS, because Kentucky’s blood shield statute barred strict
liability claims, and proof of compliance with industry standards of care was sufficient
evidence of non-negligence).
110. The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) causes AIDS (the Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome). See Kevin Hopkins, Blood, Sweat, and Tears: Toward a
New Paradigm for Protecting Donor Privacy, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 141, 142–50 (2000)
(discussing the competing interests of blood donor privacy, recovery by blood
recipients for infections caused by contaminated blood, and society’s interest in
maintaining an adequate blood supply, and arguing in favor of protecting the privacy
interest of blood donors now that adequate screening technology is available).
111. See id. (noting the fact that few AIDS-related cases result from blood
transfusions, but discussing reasons why this risk remains a legitimate concern).
112. For example, Georgia’s statute makes it unlawful for any person or entity “to
buy or sell, to offer to buy or sell, or to assist . . . buying or selling . . . a human body
or any part of a human body or . . . a human fetus or any part thereof.” GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-12-160(a) (2007). However, “[t]he purchase or sale of whole blood, blood
plasma, blood products, blood derivatives, other self-replicating body fluids, or hair”
is exempted. Id. § 16-12-160(b)(1).
113. National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,702 (Sept. 10, 1974); see, e.g., Murphy
v. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247, 252 (Cal. 1985) (contrasting the public policy
of maintaining an adequate national blood supply, which underlies California’s
prohibition on classification of a sale or transfer of blood as a sale of goods in order
to prevent strict liability suits if that blood is contaminated, with the sale of a
pharmaceutical product).
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114

This insulates
blood donation as a service, not a sale of a good.
blood donors, hospitals and blood banks from strict liability and
invocation of the Uniform Commercial Code’s (“UCC”) warranties
115
Thus, these statutes restrict the
that attach to sales of goods.
116
liability of donors, banks and hospitals to negligence or fraud.
Many of the blood shield statutes are not limited in scope to blood,
but include all human tissue in their wording, even if that tissue is
paid for; a typical statute does not mention human eggs, but refers to
117
human “tissue,” which arguably includes gametes.
In suits against blood donors themselves for negligence, the
donor’s privacy and medical confidentiality interests are weighed
118
against the public policy of maintaining an adequate blood supply.
Generally, the public interest is deemed to outweigh an individual
119
donor’s privacy interest.
In many states, statutes authorize
120
Separate
disclosure of a blood donor’s identity for good cause.
114. See Kathryn W. Pieplow, Comment, AIDS, Blood Banks, and the Courts: The
Legal Response to Transfusion-Acquired Disease, 38 S.D. L. REV. 609, 622–24 (1993)
(detailing the blood shield statutes enacted in response to negligence and strict
liability suits brought by patients infected with AIDS through blood transfusions); see
also Murphy, 710 P.2d at 252 (noting that the purpose of blood shield statutes is to
“avoid application of the doctrine of strict liability” to individuals involved in the
production, use, or sale of blood plasma, “thereby promoting the constant availability
of an adequate supply of blood”). “In keeping with this purpose, it is held that a
hospital using blood in a transfusion, a blood bank supplying the blood and a
manufacturer of blood plasma selling it for transfusion are immune from strict
liability because the Legislature has declared . . . that they are providing a service
rather than making a sale.” Id. (citations omitted).
115. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 20, at 529. (explaining that under strict liability
precautions taken by the seller would be irrelevant, as the sole determinant of
liability would be the quality of the blood).
116. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2 (1993). (declaring that distributing
blood in IL is a service and precluding the application of strict tort liability).
117. Illinois’s blood shield statute is typical and broadly worded:
[U]sing human whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives and
products, corneas, bones, or organs or other human tissue for the purpose
of injecting, transfusing or transplanting any of them in the human body is
declared for purposes of liability in tort or contract to be the rendition of a
service by every person, firm or corporation participating therein, whether
or not any remuneration is paid therefor, and is declared not to be a sale of
any such items and no warranties of any kind . . . nor strict tort liability shall
be applicable thereto . . . .
Id.
118. E.g., Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 374 (Wash. 1991)
(applying a balancing test that requires the court to “identify and weigh the
comparative and compelling public and private interests of plaintiff, defendant and
the donor”). See generally Hopkins, supra note 110, at 153 (promoting donors’ privacy
interest now that adequate screening technology exists).
119. Hopkins, supra note 110, at 156–57.
120. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-9 (West 2007) (“The record of a person who has
or is suspected of having AIDS or HIV infection may be disclosed by an order of a
court of competent jurisdiction which is granted pursuant to an application showing
good cause therefor.”).
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actions against donors themselves are allowed in instances of
121
As the Sixth Circuit
misrepresentation, fraud or negligence.
explains:
The donor’s privacy interests are substantial, as is the public
interest in maintaining a safe and adequate blood supply.
However . . . [the plaintiffs’] right to litigate their claims against
the donor substantially outweighs the competing interests,
especially . . . [if] there is significant evidence to suggest that the
122
donor’s conduct was suspect.

This balancing of interests foreshadows the probable balancing of
the similar interests in play in egg donation situations.
II. ANALYSIS: IS AN EGG DONOR LIABLE FOR HER GENETIC DEFECTS?
The two legal theories under which an egg donor might be held
liable for transmitting latent genetic disorders to an egg donation
child, and both fall within the purview of tort law: product liability
and negligence. In Part II, they are discussed in turn, and this
Comment concludes that while courts could potentially impose
liability under either, the inability to know of genetic predispositions,
the public policy implications of recognizing an egg donor as a
genetic parent, and the best interests of an egg donation child all
support not holding the egg donor liable.
A. Human Eggs as Commodities
If human eggs are considered products, egg donors’ future liability
as producers and sellers of these “marketable goods” may potentially
permit actions in tort for failure to warn of “product” defects, namely,
123
Whether human eggs are
a disease carried in their genes.
124
marketable goods has not been determined in America, but such a
121. See, e.g., Coleman v. Am. Red Cross, 1994 Fed. App. 0156P (6th Cir.), 23 F.3d
1091 (allowing discovery of a donor’s identity and medical information when the
plaintiff is pursuing a separate claim against the blood donor when the blood donor
intentionally misrepresented his risk status prior to repeatedly donating).
122. Id. at 1096.
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 402A (1965).
124. See, e.g., Ethics Comm., Compensation, supra note 22, at 306 (noting that,
although some believe that “payment for oocytes implies that they are property or
commodities, and thus devalues human life[,] . . . [c]ompensation based on a
reasonable assessment of the time, inconvenience, and discomfort associated with
oocyte retrieval can and should be distinguished from payment for the oocytes
themselves”).
By comparison, several western countries, including England and Italy, have
banned all payment for human eggs to avoid the ethical quagmires created by
“selling” body parts or babies. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c.
37, § 12 (Eng.) (prohibiting payment to egg donors other than compensation for
actual expenses); see also Law 40/2004 of Feb. 19, 2004, 2004 Gazz. Uff. No. 45, Feb.
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determination will have broad implications in a case in which a
genetic disease is passed from an egg donor, unknowingly but
without negligence, to an egg donation child. Thus, the threshold
question in an analysis of the liability of an egg donor is whether eggs
125
While treatment of human eggs as marketable
are commodities.
goods—such that egg donors, as vendors, could be held to be
guarantors of their genes—is unlikely because of the public policy
implications, the tremendous payments donors receive from
intending parents leave the possibility open. Classification of eggs as
products would allow an egg donation recipient to bring an action
against the donor under a product liability theory, discussed in Part
II.A.1. It is also conceivable that a recipient parent might argue a
breach of implied warranties under the UCC, analyzed in Part II.A.3.
A small-sample American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(“ASRM”) survey of egg donation found that the average
compensation given to donors is $5,204, though payment can be
126
considerably higher.
In fact, egg donation received its first major
mass media attention in 1999 when an anonymous couple ran an
advertisement in elite college newspapers offering $50,000 for the
127
eggs of a tall woman with SAT scores over 1400.
As many
commented at the time, most egg “donors” are perhaps more
128
accurately referred to as “vendors.” However, others, including the

24, 2004 (restricting ART such that Italy has one of the least permissive approaches
to ART of any western country, in part because it defines “embryo” from the moment
of fertilization).
125. The essential question is whether one can have a property interest in one’s
own body or body part. This debate has been raging for centuries. Compare Donna
M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human
Research Participants’ Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
257 (2004) (critiquing the market-inalienability approach to proprietary interests in
human tissue, arguing for recognition of property rights in one’s own body, and
proposing a hybrid approach combining the donative and liability-based systems),
with Wancata, supra note 22, at 201–12 (discussing this debate, analyzing the relevant
case law, and arguing in favor of the inalienability of the human body and its
component parts).
126. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Highlights from the 62nd Annual Meeting of
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (2006) [hereinafter ASRM,
Highlights]; see also Claudia Kalb, Baby Boom: The $50,000 Egg, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15,
1999, at 64 (reporting that some highly sought donors—“intelligent, athletic”
individuals at Ivy League colleges—have been offered up to $50,000 in
compensation).
127. Kalb, supra note 126, at 64 ; Gina Kolata, $50,000 Offered to Tall, Smart Egg
Donor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at A10; Irene Sege, A $50,000 Dilemma on Campus,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1999, § 1, at 1.
128. Kalb, supra note 126, at 64.
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ASRM, argue compensation should be given for a donor’s time,
129
discomfort and effort.
Is the donor paid for her time and hassle or for her eggs
themselves? There is support for both arguments. In favor of
classification as payment for services rendered, most fertility clinics
130
define their fees according to a variety of services, not products.
Also, an egg donor is usually paid regardless of the number or quality
of eggs extracted from her, though an unsuccessful cycle (not
resulting in conception) sometimes results in a reduction in the
131
amount paid.
ASRM guidelines require that payment not be
contingent upon successful egg retrieval or the quantity or quality of
132
So, unlike surrogacy agreements, in which money is
the eggs.
133
arguably exchanged for an actual child, payment for human eggs is
134
Therefore, it probably
not contingent upon the birth of a child.
does not violate the public policy against baby-selling.
On the other hand, because egg donation payments are arguably
made for the eggs themselves, rather than the service rendered,
courts might find human eggs to be marketable products. In support
129. See Ethics Comm., Compensation, supra note 22, at 305 (asserting that
compensation for egg donation is ethically justified, and “should be structured to
acknowledge the time, inconvenience, and discomfort associated with screening,
ovarian stimulation, and oocyte retrieval,” but that compensation “should not vary
according to the planned use of the oocytes, the number or quality of oocytes
retrieved, the number or outcome of prior donation cycles, or the donor’s ethnic or
other personal characteristics,” and it should not exceed $10,000).
130. For example, a Chicago-based fertility clinic explains on its website how its
$23,200 IVF fees break down: $13,050 is the agency’s fee for matching couples with
donors, $2,800 is an administrative donation cycle fee, $350 is for extra medical
insurance, $7,000 is the donor’s compensation, and $3,000 is for the donor’s medical
treatment.
Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago, Egg Donation Cost,
http://www.advancedfertility.com/eggdonationcost.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
131. See, e.g., ADVISORY GROUP, GET THE FACTS, supra note 26, at 21–22 (noting that
“some (but not all) programs provide partial compensation” when a cycle fails to
result in conception).
132. Ethics Comm., Compensation, supra note 22, at 305.
133. Compare Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Gestation: Work for Hire or the Essence of
Motherhood? A Comparative Legal Analysis, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 91 (2002)
(comparing the permissibility of gestational surrogacy payment under Israeli,
American and Jewish law, and concluding these arrangements subjugate the interests
of the surrogate under any system), with Jennifer L. Watson, Note and Comment,
Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should Surrogate Mothers Be
Compensated for Their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 529 (2007)
(arguing for payment of gestational surrogates).
134. Similarly, surrogacy contracts are void because they violate the strong public
policy against baby-selling if payment is in any way contingent upon or variable
according to the successful birth of the anticipated child. For example, Florida’s
adoption code includes the following surrogacy provision: “A preplanned adoption
agreement shall not contain any provision . . . [t]o reduce any amount paid to the
volunteer mother if the child is stillborn or is born alive but impaired, or to provide
for the payment of a supplement or bonus for any reason.” FLA. STAT. § 63.213(3)(a)
(2007).
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of this side of the argument, the more desirable a donor’s genes
are—manifested in attractiveness, athleticism, SAT scores, et cetera—
the more she receives in payment for donating eggs at many
135
This suggests payment is actually for the genes
agencies.
themselves, rather than the services of the girl from whom they are
harvested.
The position of state legislatures concerning similar classifications
is informative regarding how states may handle classification of egg
donation. Surrogacy contracts are unlawful in more than a few states
136
because of the feared commodification of children (baby-selling).
Louisiana, uniquely, takes the extreme approach that even the sale of
unfertilized gametes is baby-selling, and thus has banned all payment
137
In keeping, in adoption, any payment to assume legal
for eggs.
138
control of a child is clearly unlawful. Blood shield statutes, on the
139
However,
other hand, expressly classify blood as non-products.
sperm is readily bought and sold, as indicated by some courts’ refusal
to consider sperm donors to be patients of the clinics they transact
140
with. Sperm also falls easily within the definition of “regenerative”
tissue, which is exempted from the ban on the sale of body parts in
141
several states.
By comparison, egg donation is clearly not analogous to surrogacy
or adoption—an unfertilized human egg is not a child, nor is
conception guaranteed from mere completion of a donation cycle.
Eggs are also unlike sperm because they are not regenerative human

135. See, e.g., Terri Yablonsky Stat, ‘Premium’ Human Eggs Unsettling Practitioners,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 2006, at Q8 (describing the egg donation industry’s reaction to
the ethical issues raised by some women’s eggs being considered more valuable than
others based on education, proven fertility, or ethnicity).
136. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing a New Jersey Supreme Court decision
invalidating a surrogacy contract based on that state’s public policy against babyselling).
137. See supra Part I.C (noting that, while various states regulate artificial
insemination, sperm donation, and surrogacy, only Louisiana directly regulates egg
donation).
138. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing legal regulation of adoption).
139. See supra Part I.D.4 (examining blood shield statutes, and noting that many of
them are not limited to blood, but rather apply to all human tissue, which arguably
includes human gametes).
140. E.g., Johnson v. Cal. Cryobank, Inc., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Ct. App. 2000). See
generally Wancata, supra note 22, at 220–23 (using economic theory to explain the
discrepancy between the compensation paid for the sale of sperm and the amount
given to egg donors, and noting women have a fixed number of eggs, whereas sperm
regenerates).
141. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f(c)(1) (West 1999) (Defining “human organ”
as including “a human kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, or any other human
organ or nonrenewable or nonregenerative tissue except plasma and sperm”).
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142

The same is true of a comparison with blood. Despite the
tissue.
market incentives created by such high compensation, human eggs
143
are arguably included in the broad “human tissue” language of
many blood shield statutes, which bar classification of blood donation
144
as a sale of goods.
However, though availability of human eggs is emotionally
145
important for some, it is not medically imperative for many, so the
public policy underlying blood shield statutes is inapplicable to egg
donation. Some courts refuse to extend the statutes’ protections to
cover defendants not specifically intended by the enacting
146
legislatures, which were exclusively concerned with blood supply. It
follows that, though some blood shield statutes could be interpreted
to classify egg donation as a service, given the public policy impetus
for their enactment, courts may well refuse to interpret these
147
perceived “luxury” goods to be within a legislature’s intended
148
scope.
Thus, unless legislatures act to classify egg donation as a non-sale
rendition of a service, it is likely that a recipient parent or egg
donation child will at least try to seek recovery under a product
liability or UCC theory for a disease inherited from the egg donor.
On balance, as will be discussed below, egg donation will probably be
treated as a service by a reviewing court on policy grounds, denying
use of either theory against an egg donor for failure to warn.

142. See Wancata, supra note 22, at 200 (contrasting between the nearly “limitless
supply” of sperm and the “restricted . . . supply” of eggs).
143. See supra Part I.D.4 (describing blood shield statutes). See generally Pieplow,
supra note 114, at 622–25 (discussing three different types of blood shield statues
enacted in different jurisdictions).
144. Though inclusion of human eggs within the scope of blood shield statutes
has not been thoroughly analyzed to date, the analogous issue of sperm’s potential
inclusion is analyzed in McIntyre, supra note 20, at 529–30 & nn.57–59, in which the
public policy behind blood shield statutes is applied to an analysis of sperm donation
liability under product liability theories.
145. See, e.g., Lynette Reid et al., Compensation for Gamete Donation: The Analogy with
Jury Duty, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 35, 37–38 (2007) (rejecting the
notion that egg donation is a public service by comparing it to jury duty).
146. See, e.g., J.K.B. v. Armour Pharm. Co., 660 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)
(denying the defendant pharmaceutical company protection under Indiana’s blood
shield statute because the statute’s enumeration of banks, storage facilities, and
hospitals implied the legislature intentionally omitted pharmaceutical companies
from the statute’s protective scope when interpreted using standard rules of statutory
construction).
147. Because of the tremendous costs associated with IVF and egg donation,
totaling thousands of dollars, these ARTs are usually not accessible to less than
wealthy individuals or couples.
148. McIntyre makes this argument for semen’s exclusion from blood shield
statutes’ coverage. McIntyre, supra note 20, at 530.
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1.

Product liability
If eggs are commodities, then egg donors may be liable for defects
just as a manufacturer is subject to product liability. Product liability
places the burden of liability on a product’s manufacturer as a matter
of public policy; producers are in the best position to discover
dangerous defects in their products, so the burden of protection,
including a duty to warn, is better placed on their shoulders than
149
upon those of the uninformed consumer. Producers and sellers are
also better equipped to bear the cost of discovering and fixing
defects, as well as the cost of remedying injuries caused by their
150
products.
To succeed under a traditional product liability theory, a consumer
must show he was injured by a product defect present at the time of
manufacture, about which he was not adequately warned, regardless
151
of any care exercised by the manufacturer.
As the Restatement
(Third) of Torts explains, someone “engaged [commercially] in the
business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or
distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm . . .
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 402A cmt. c (1998)
(“[J]ustification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, by marketing
his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special
responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it;
that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products which it
needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will
stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental
injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance
can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum
of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those
who market the products.”).
150. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962)
(justifying product liability as a means “to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves”).
151. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (2004). Maine’s products liability statute
is a typical example:
One who sells any goods or products in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to a person whom the
manufacturer, seller or supplier might reasonably have expected to use,
consume or be affected by the goods, or to his property, if the seller is
engaged in the business of selling such a product and it is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without significant change in the condition
in which it is sold. This section applies although the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product and the user or
consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998) (defining several
categories of product defect); 63 AM. JUR. 2D PROD. LIAB. § 517 (2007) (providing an
overview of strict liability for product defects).
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152

The Third Restatement includes a product
caused by the defect.”
liability provision that extends the duty to warn to cover defects the
153
However, the seller must or should
seller learns of after the sale.
154
know of the risk, otherwise a duty to warn cannot exist, and the
seller must be able to identify those to whom a warning should be
155
Also, the risk of harm must be sufficiently great to justify
given.
imposing a duty to warn on the seller, the warning must be feasible
and able to be acted upon, and a consumer must be reasonably
156
One limitation is that
assumed not to otherwise know of the risk.
the producer must be commercially engaged in the regular activity of
157
making or selling the product in question.
Importantly, because
the contracts governing egg donation sever all rights and
158
responsibilities between the donor and eggs, privity of contract
159
between the buyer and seller is not required.
If human eggs are products, and thus donors are producers, the
160
elements of a failure to warn prima facie case are likely met.
Egg
donors do produce eggs, which they sell to recipients for foreseeable
fertility purposes. If those eggs carry a genetic disease, then they are
defective for their intended purpose, and the danger is a potentially
crippling illness or even death. Of course, this is also true of sperm
and blood donation, though a product liability action has never

152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998).
153. Id. § 10.
154. Id. § 10 cmt. c.
155. Id. § 10(b).
156. Id.
157. Id. § 2 cmt. a; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 402A
cmt. f (1965) (noting that strict liability for harms caused by a defective product only
applies to a person “engaged in the business of selling” the product).
158. The contractual provisions severing any relationship between the egg donor
and the eggs harvested from her are critical components of the egg donation process
that serve to protect the recipient parents and any ensuing egg donation children
from future conflicts of parentage. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing defenses available
to an egg donor in an action based on the donor’s failure to warn of the possibility of
a genetic disease). Without such a termination of any and all relationship, the donor
might later assert parental rights. Id. The effect of these contracts on future liability
of the kind analyzed in this comment will be discussed in greater detail in Section
II.B.1–2.
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 402A(2)(b) (1965).
160. The elements are only probably met because the element of causation is
difficult to prove when the egg, which then grew into the child, was always a carrier
of the genetic disease, and therefore the injury was arguably not caused by donor’s
failure to warn of the preexisting defect when she became aware of it. See infra Part
II.B.1.c (providing a more detailed discussion of the difficulties of proving
causation).
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successfully been brought against a sperm donor, and blood shield
161
statutes bar such actions against blood donors.
However, as a threshold matter, even if human eggs are marketable
goods, egg donors are not often “engaged in the business” of selling
162
or otherwise distributing them. Though there are rare cases where
a single donor has sold her eggs as many as twelve times, most donors
163
donate no more than once or twice. It is therefore unlikely that a
product liability action could prevail against an egg donor, except in
the extremely rare case of abnormally frequent donations.
2.

Defenses available to the egg donor
Several defenses are readily available to a defendant egg donor in
this situation. First, a manufacturer is not liable for a failure to warn
164
if the danger is “open and obvious” or “readily ascertainable.”
Here, the risks of reproduction are commonplace and commonsense;
birth defects and complications during pregnancy and labor are
165
universally understood to be inherent in human reproduction.
Certainly the danger of genetic disease is no greater when conception
166
As such, the risk that a child
is achieved through egg donation.
may have a disorder is arguably open and obvious, and is thus not
actionable under a product liability theory.
Second, a manufacturer is not liable if the consumer is better
informed, or a “sophisticated user,” which is a corollary to the open
and obvious defense because a consumer’s experience with the
167
product amplifies that which should be open and obvious. Product
liability assumes the manufacturer is considerably more
knowledgeable in the relevant area than the consumer and is
therefore better, and more properly able to avert or fix product

161. See supra Part I.D.3–4 (discussing the regulation of blood and semen
donation, including blood shield statutes that insulate blood donors from strict
liability for damages caused by diseased or defective blood).
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 402A cmt. f (1965).
163. See, e.g., DEREK, supra note 13, at 201 (describing the eleventh cycle of a selfdescribed egg donation “junkie”).
164. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Prod. Liab. § 92 (2007).
165. See McIntyre, supra note 20, at 543 (noting the risk of passing on genetic
disease exists in sexual reproduction, but that situation provides the parties the
opportunity to investigate the partner’s genetic make-up in advance).
166. See Robertson, supra note 58, at 8 (recognizing the dangers inherent to ART
are also inherent to coital reproduction).
167. See, e.g., Koken v. Black & Veatch Constr., Inc., 426 F.3d 39, 45-46 (1st Cir.
2005) (upholding summary judgment for the defendant manufacturer because the
plaintiff consumer was a sophisticated user, and the danger posed by a fire blanket
was open and obvious to a reasonable sophisticated user).
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168

Here, however, the egg “seller” is usually less
defects.
169
Egg
knowledgeable than the “consumer,” the recipient parents.
170
donors are very rarely medical experts. This is because the average
age of donors is approximately twenty-four, many donate in order to
pay down student loans or credit card debt, and many would not
171
Though
donate again for less than the $5,000 initially received.
there are exceptions, young, money-motivated donors usually know
less about egg donation and IVF than the recipient parents, who are
172
heavily invested financially, emotionally and medically.
Further, the recipient couple will know enough about genetics and
reproduction to have chosen a donor based on her appearance and
medical history, while the reverse is not true because donors do not
173
The recipient couple is thus, at least arguably, a
select recipients.
sufficiently sophisticated user of the eggs not to require a warning
from the egg donor. Moreover, as the child in this hypothetical suit
is already at least several years old when the failure to warn occurs, his
birth parents are exclusively well-situated to be the best informed of

168. Cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 63 (Cal. 1962)
(implying the discrepancy between manufacturers and “powerless” consumers is the
rationale for holding manufacturers to strict liability for product defects).
169. In 2004, IVF with donated eggs was only successful in 50.5 % of transfers, and
only 30.5 % of the time when the embryos were frozen prior to implantation. CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 2004 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (ART) REPORT 81
(2006). This fact hints at the number of repeat attempts recipient parents make.
Furthermore, many intending parents start first trying to use their own gametes
before turning to donors. Thus, while a given cycle is usually at most a second
experience with donating eggs for the donor herself, the recipient parents may well
be in their fourth or fifth attempt. E.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998)
(deciding a case in which the divorcing couple underwent ten failed IVF cycles,
costing over $75,000).
170. This statement is qualified only because it is possible that some egg donors
are medical students or professionals.
171. ASRM, Highlights, supra note 126; see, e.g., Carlene Hempel, Golden Eggs:
Drowning in Credit Card Debt and Student Loans, Young Women Are Selling Their Eggs for
Big Payoffs. But Can They Really Make the Right Medical and Moral Decisions When They’re
Tempted with $15,000?, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., June 25, 2006, at 19 (profiling Jamie
Galbraith, a repeat egg donor who has donated, in part, in order to earn money to
pay student loans and a down payment for a house).
172. This level of investment is necessarily true given the more than $20,000 a full
egg donation and IVF cycle costs. See Bridgewater, supra note 16 (noting the
significant financial costs involved in IVF). Though reliable statistics have not been
accumulated, and because success rates vary tremendously based on a multiplicity of
factors, many intending parents undergo several cycles before successful conception
and birth, as shown in the fact that IVF success rates are at best 50%. CDC, SUCCESS
RATES, supra note 33, at 17. For further discussion of IVF success rates, see supra note
169 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., HELANE S. ROSENBERG & YAKOV M. EPSTEIN, THE AMERICAN SURROGACY
CENTER, INC., EGG DONATION: PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCES OF RECIPIENTS 1 (1996),
http://www.surrogacy.com/Articles/news_view.asp?ID=46. (discussing the in-depth
psychological analysis and corresponding factors weighed in selecting an egg donor).
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his health. Therefore, the donor can assert that she does not owe a
continuing duty to warn, because the recipient parents are better
informed than she is, and are sophisticated users.
Third, the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, applicable in medical
175
contexts, would likely intercept the egg donor’s liability for failing
to warn the egg donation child of her subsequently discovered
genetic disease. The doctrine indemnifies medical manufacturers
from liability for failing to warn patients about a product if the
manufacturer informs an expert directly in the supply chain, and
176
upon whom the patient relies. So, a pharmaceutical company is not
liable for harm caused by failing to warn a patient-consumer about a
drug it produces if the company warned the doctor who prescribed
177
the drug to the patient.
In this case, the egg donation agency and fertility clinic are learned
intermediaries, and they are substantially more informed than either
178
the egg donor or the recipient parents. Also, both the donor and
the parents reasonably rely fully on the medical expertise of the
179
All screening is done by one of these
agency and clinic.
intermediaries, as is the aspiration surgery, the selection of eggs, the
180
fertilization, and the implantation.
At least one court has found
181
that an agency has a fiduciary duty. It follows that warnings about
genetic defects possibly carried by the eggs should be given by the
fertility clinic or agency rather than the egg donor.
Lastly, the danger must be an unreasonable one for liability to
182
attach to a manufacturer or seller for not warning a consumer. Egg
174. Obviously, a child’s parents are most familiar with his medical history and
needs as they are uniquely positioned to observe him from birth and on a day-to-day
basis.
175. See, e.g., Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that
for a manufacturer to discharge its duty to warn by informing a knowledgeable party
in the supply chain, and thereby be able to assert the doctrine of learned
intermediaries as a defense, it “must be able to reasonably rely on the intermediary
to warn the ultimate user”).
176. Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of LearnedIntermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5TH 1 (2007).
177. Id.
178. This is true of any professional vis-à-vis his patients or customers because that
relationship involves one party’s dependence on another’s skill and expertise, and is
thus the principle underlying why professionals are held to a higher duty of care
than lay people. See infra notes 198–199, 202 and accompanying text.
179. See infra Part II.B.1.a (questioning whether an egg donor owes a duty of care
to a child born as a product of the donor’s egg).
180. See supra notes 1–3 (providing an overview of IVF and other forms of ART).
181. See Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding the surrogacy
agency had a fiduciary duty to protect the parties).
182. E.g., McIntyre, supra note 20, at 534–37 (explaining the unreasonably
dangerous requirement and applying it to an analysis of a sperm donor’s liability
under a product liability theory, and arguing that mandatory consent forms ensure
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donors are normal members of the population at large with no
distinguishing characteristics other than their choice to donate, so
the risk of their carrying a genetic disease is no higher than any other
individual and thus the risks of conception through egg donation are
no more unreasonable than those posed by traditional human
reproduction.
Most importantly, holding an egg donor to a continuing duty to
warn under a product liability theory demands that she guarantee her
genetic make-up. Just as strict liability in tort holds manufacturers
liable for any dangerous, injury-causing defect, regardless of care
taken, strict liability, if applied to egg donation, would mandate that
egg donors foresee the unforeseeable.
Given genetic
unpredictability, which remains despite the availability of gene
mapping and genetic tests, the hypothetical child conceived with a
donated egg subsequently discovered to carry a genetic defect
183
probably will not recover under a product liability theory.
3.

Implied warranties of fitness and merchantability
The UCC governs sales of goods by merchants, so if eggs are
classified as a marketable good and egg donors are considered
184
185
merchants, then egg donation would fall within the UCC’s scope.
The UCC, adopted in every state, requires that goods “pass without
objection in the trade under the contract description; and . . . are fit
for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that description are
186
used.” However, for these requirements to apply, the seller must be
“a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
187
the practices or goods involved in the transaction.”
Certainly, adoption and surrogacy are not governed by the UCC,
188
Blood
because payment cannot lawfully be made for children.
donation is governed by blood shield statutes that specifically bar use

consumers of donated sperm know of the possibility of genetic or birth defects, but
may not know the degree of danger faced).
183. See supra Part II.A (discussing whether human eggs may properly be
considered commodities for the purpose of applying principles of strict tort liability).
184. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1986) (“[A] warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind.”).
185. Cf. McIntyre, supra note 20, at 528–33 (analyzing the application of the
implied warranty of merchantability to sperm donation).
186. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a), (c).
187. Id. § 2-204.
188. See supra Part I.D.1 (indicating that a surrogacy contract was invalided and
that adoption statutes prohibit the sale of babies).
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of implied warranties in actions against blood donors or banks.
Sperm donation is analogous to egg donation, except that sperm is a
regenerative bodily product, so sperm donors can more easily be
190
considered persons dealing in their body’s “product.” Egg donors
rarely donate more than a few times and have little expertise
191
Therefore, it is
compared with other parties to the transaction.
unlikely an egg donor could be a dealer in eggs, so the UCC is likely
inapplicable.
Furthermore, if warranties attach to the sale of human eggs, then
egg donors will have to guarantee that their “product” is fit for
creating a child who does not suffer from a genetic disease. At the
current level of genetic expertise, this is impossible. However, the
egg donation child might bring a negligence action against the donor
for failure to warn him of her inheritable genetic disease once she
was diagnosed.
B. Negligence
To prove a prima facie case of negligence, the egg donation child
must prove the egg donor owed him a duty of care, which she
breached, and her breach actually and proximately caused his
192
injury.
Each of these elements presents discrete challenges to the
prospective egg donation child’s case.
1.

The prima facie negligence case
a.

A duty of care

At common law, a person owes no duty to affirmatively act to
protect another from danger not caused by his own action or
inaction, unless a special relationship exists between the two people,
such as a parent-child relationship or that between a doctor and
189. See supra Part I.D.4 (noting that the donation of blood is classified as a service
and not a good because of public policy implications and national need for blood for
medical reasons).
190. Men can sell sperm weekly over periods of years. See, e.g., Wancata, supra
note 22, at 221–22 (illustrating how the donation of sperm is a market commodity);
cf. McIntyre, supra note 20, at 531–33 (explaining that characterizing sperm as a
commodity is resonant of baby-selling, so a plaintiff asserting that sperm is a
marketable good in order to recover under an implied warranty theory would find
himself in the “catch-22” of defeating his own theory on public policy grounds).
191. The egg donation process is invasive and frequently uncomfortable, and the
health effects are not yet properly known, so most egg donors are cautioned against
multiple donations. See, e.g., ADVISORY GROUP, GET THE FACTS, supra note 26, at 23–24
(detailing the potential health consequences of multiple donations, and cautioning
against signing a consent form for multiple donations).
192. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 71 (2007).
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193

Thus, there is generally no duty to warn absent a special
patient.
194
In the context of
relationship creating an elevated duty of care.
genetics, the egg donor cannot jeopardize anyone simply by having a
genetic disease, so there is no affirmative duty to warn absent a
195
special relationship.
In a negligence action brought by the egg donation child, the
special relationship between him and the egg donor might be
established either through genetic parentage or under a “risk imports
196
relation” theory whereby a special relationship is created by the
magnitude of the harm involved and the fact that the egg donor is
197
the only person who could prevent or mitigate that harm.
The
former is unlikely to prevail because of the negative public policy
implications of recognizing, however narrowly, an egg donor as a
parent. Conversely, the public policy interests implicated by the
latter theory may well persuade a court to find a continuing duty to
warn, and though the egg donation contract severs any legal
relationship between the parties, it is likely a court would invalidate
such an absolute agreement as void against public policy.

193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
According to the
Restatement:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent
him from causing harm to another unless (a) a special relationship exists
between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor
to control the third person’s conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between
the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection.
Id.
194. Id. § 314 (“The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his
part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a
duty to take such action.”).
195. See, e.g., Suter, supra note 18, at 1881 (discussing whether an injury can arise
from a family member’s disclosure to another family member about having a genetic
disorder, and noting “[t]heir relatives have no risk of becoming carriers; they only
have the risk of finding out that they are carriers”).
196. The “risk imports relation” theory was articulated by Judge Cardozo in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., and establishes that what constitutes reasonable
care taken to avert or minimize a risk depends on the nature of the risk as reasonably
understood by the person with the duty of care, and so the larger the risk the greater
the duty of care reasonably anticipated by the actor becomes. 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y.
1928) (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk
imports relation; it is risk to another or others within the range of apprehension.”).
197. See generally Matthew Browne, Note, Preconception Tort Law in an Era of Assisted
Reproduction: Applying a Nexus Test for Duty, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2555, 2555 (analyzing
the legal and ethical dilemmas associated with finding that someone not yet born, or
not yet conceived, is nonetheless owed a duty of care, and arguing for tort liability in
cases of injury to children conceived with ART to be determined based on the
relationship between the activity causing harm and the harm actually caused).
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The doctor-patient dynamic is the classic example of a special
198
relationship because it is necessarily of the most intimate nature,
and the patient submits to the doctor’s care in reliance upon his skill
199
and experience.
Originally, physicians were obligated to inform
only their patients of possible transmission of contagious or genetic
200
diseases to known or foreseeable third parties, but they are now
required to directly warn foreseeable third parties who are not their
201
patients.
These duties to warn arise only because of the special
relationship, backed by public policy imperatives that individuals
202
responsible for life and death operate at a high level of care.
Similarly, parent-child relationships are characterized by intimacy,
dependency, and one party’s responsibility for the other.
203
Consequently, they give rise to an elevated duty of care. However,
parental status can be severed such that no relationship exists
between a mother and child. For example, an adoption agency is not
considered to owe any duty to warn, especially not a continuing duty,
204
to the biological parents of a child relinquished through adoption.
198. See, e.g., Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791, 793–94 (Ky. 1952) (noting that the
doctor-patient relationship is unique because of the patient’s reliance on the
doctor’s expertise and the doctor’s duty of good faith towards the patient).
199. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (comparing the civil,
statutory and common law considerations of special relationships characterized by
dependence by one party on the other that give rise to duties of care).
200. See, e.g., Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 1995) (mandating that a
physician warn his patient that the congenital illness suffered from is likely to
develop in the patient’s children when a reasonably prudent physician would issue a
warning in the same circumstance).
201. Seminally, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California expanded a medical
professional’s duty to warn to encompass foreseeable third parties known to be at
risk of danger, even when such a third party is not one of the medical professional’s
patients. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). The court rejected the traditional rule that no
duty was owed and reasoned that the doctors’ professional duty of care for the
patient extended to the foreseeable victim, despite concerns about medical
confidentiality. Id. at 343; see, e.g., Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (articulating a new duty to warn not just the patient that
her genetic disease might affect her children, but also to take reasonable steps to
warn those third party children themselves). See generally Susan M. Denbo, What Your
Genes Know Affects Them: Should Patient Confidentiality Prevent Disclosure of Genetic Test
Results to a Patient’s Biological Relatives?, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 561, 580–86 (2006) (tracing
the development of the duty to warn relatives of genetic disease suffered by patients
that is the exception to the doctor-patient privilege).
202. See, e.g., 61 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 185 (“The welfare of the citizens of a state,
and therefore of a state itself, demands that those persons practicing medicine and
surgery must be duly able and careful.”).
203. See, e.g., Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Parent for Injury to
Unemancipated Child Caused by Parent’s Negligence—Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.4TH 1066
(2007) (describing the parent-child relationship and the various ways different
jurisdictions assess the liability of the parent for injury to the child caused by the
parent).
204. See Olson v. Children’s Home Soc’y of Cal., 252 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13 (Ct. App.
1988) (finding no nexus between the injury and the actions undertaken by the
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This is true even when the adoptee dies of a genetic disease that
205
future children of the biological parents will also suffer from.
The complication in an egg donation situation is how one defines
“parent.” Traditionally, the biological connection established by
206
birth defined “mother.”
In an egg donation context, a child can
potentially have five distinct “parents” through biological, genetic
207
and social relationships. In the few cases in which egg donation has
208
been a factor, starting with Johnson v. Calvert, courts have struggled
with how to assign relative weight to genetic relationships versus
209
biological and social ones. In that case, the court recognized both
genetic and biological maternity under the UPA, but declined to rule
210
the child had two mothers.
As indicated in Johnson, the genetic relationship between the egg
donor and the egg donation child is substantial enough to create at
least a quasi-parental relationship that may give rise to a duty to
211
warn. The nature of this relationship could only be a parent-child
relationship, unless a court chooses to carve out a distinct genetic
basis on which a duty to warn can be premised. Yet, courts have
almost invariably recognized the parental rights of intending parents
212
The California Supreme Court’s
over those of genetic parents.
rationale for this preference, in Johnson, was that the intent to bring
the child into existence, manifested in the surrogacy agreement,
213
served as a tiebreaker between the two versions of maternity. Many
scholars have argued that this preference for intent-based family

adoption agency, and thus no special relationship giving rise to a continuing duty to
warn), review denied, No. S007860, 1988 Cal. LEXIS 308 (Cal. Dec. 22, 1988).
205. Olson, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
206. See Dolgin, supra note 3, at 524 (noting that, traditionally, “familial bonds
[were] predicated on, and [were] understood to flow from shared biogenetic
substance”) (footnote omitted).
207. Cf. In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998) (overturning the
trial court’s determination that out of the pool of potential parents, including the
anonymous sperm and egg donors, the intending mother and father, and the
gestational surrogate, the baby in question had no parents at law).
208. 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993).
209. See supra Part I.B (analyzing the limited cases addressing egg donation in the
context of custody disputes arising out of breaches of surrogacy agreements).
210. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 n.8.
211. Id. at 781.
212. See Dolgin, supra note 3, at 534–35 (analyzing cases in which courts have
considered competing claims of maternity, and concluding that courts have
exhibited a “startling readiness to displace completely the biogenetic component of
family bonds as courts expressly privilege parental intention over biological
connections in determining maternity”).
213. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (“Because two women each have presented
acceptable proof of maternity, we do not believe this case can be decided without
enquiring into the parties’ intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement.”).
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structure is part of a general societal trend toward recognition of
214
choice as the ultimate determining factor.
If a court decides to impose a duty to warn on the hypothetical egg
donor, it will probably not be on the basis of a special, genetic parentchild relationship. Courts are loath to recognize two mothers at law,
and they clearly favor recognition of the intending parent over the
215
egg donor or surrogate.
Presumably, as is the case with adoption
policy, protecting the best interests of the child requires providing
the certainty and stability that comes from preventing legal confusion
216
It follows that a court would likely shy away from
over parentage.
recognizing any parental relationship between an egg donor and an
egg donation child.
Further, in support of reserving parentage for the intending
parents, egg donation contracts manifest a clear demarcation of legal
parentage over any ensuing children. In this way, they mimic
217
adoption statutes. Nonetheless, as the willingness to void surrogacy
contracts on public policy grounds indicates, if policy interests
outweigh an egg donor’s interest in enforcing the contract to avoid
218
liability, a court would likely void the contract. One practitioner in
the area of reproductive law notes that “it is important to explain to
client couples that they cannot necessarily rely upon [enforcement
214. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, “Planned Parenthood”: Adoption, Assisted
Reproduction, and the New Ideal Family, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 85, 89–90 (1999)
(commenting on the controlling role intent plays in various alternative reproduction
situations); Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Definition Motherhood in the
Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 504–05 (1996) (noting
national polls show a preference for intent-based determinations of parentage);
Dolgin, supra note 3, at 542 (noting that the trend in the law is part of a greater
sociological trend in which “[b]iology becomes less important as contract and its
correlates (choice, intention, and promise) become more important”). See generally
Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the
Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265 (1995) (describing the role of
intent in egg donation situations and applying the “intent” test to various parentage
scenarios).
215. See supra Part I.B (supporting the public policy concern that intending
parents serve a child’s best interests).
216. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 83, at 610–11 (calling for clear determinations
of legal parentage to govern assisted reproduction situations in the way adoption is
regulated); Manning, supra note 14, at 711–16 (discussing the adoptee’s entitlement
to stability through clear legal parentage determinations). See generally Vanessa S.
Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of
Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 429, 439 (2004) (analyzing the best interests of the
child in gestational surrogacy agreements).
217. See supra Part I.D.2 (comparing adoption and egg donation because the
child in each situation is genetically related to its biological parent but the intending
parent assumes all legal rights and parental duties).
218. Cf. Vorzimer, supra note 13, at 417 (noting no California court has enforced a
surrogacy contract exactly, but have rather “considered the contract in an attempt to
adduce the parties’ intentions upon entering into the reproductive arrangement”).
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219

Though surrogacy edges closer to
of] their surrogacy contract.”
baby-selling than egg donation, the best interests of the child are still
at issue. Thus, an egg donation contract impeding those interests is
220
possibly void.
Nonetheless, liability might attach to the egg donor for failing to
221
warn her offspring under a “risk imports relation” theory.
Essentially, this principle extends a duty of care to reasonably
222
foreseeable persons.
Moreover, it suggests that the greater the
magnitude of a given danger, the more reasonably and readily it
should be perceived, and perception of the danger creates—
imports—a relationship giving rise to a duty of care.
In this situation, the egg donor discovers she has a hereditary
genetic disease, but she does not warn her offspring. Knowledge that
a disease is hereditary reasonably triggers thoughts of transmission to
children, which arguably would include any possible egg donation
children. Therefore, the egg donation child is foreseeable. Also, the
magnitude of the danger is substantial because the disease might be
life threatening. Thus, once the egg donor realizes the risk that her
children will inherit her disease, a duty to warn might develop
between her and the egg donation child.
b.

Breach

Once a duty of care is established, negligence analysis requires a
223
finding of breach of that duty.
Failure to actually warn the egg
donation child is not a per se breach of the egg donor’s duty of care
224
because only reasonable effort is required. For example, if the egg
donor were denied contact information by the egg donation agency
when she called in search of the recipient couple, her duty of care
219. Id.
220. But cf. Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 534–36 (Or.
1985) (permitting a biological mother to sue the birthing physician who divulged
her identity to a daughter she put up for adoption, because the doctor-patient
relationship created an implied contract of secrecy which he breached, causing her
injury). But see Lynn M. Squillace, Note, Too Much of a Good Thing: Toward a
Regulated Market in Human Eggs, 1 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 135, 146 (2005)
(arguing that the only grounds on which an egg donation contract should be
determined are principles of contract law, because any other approach inherently
implies that women need protecting because they are not able to knowingly and
voluntarily enter into a contract).
221. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (indicating that reasonable care
must be taken to avert or minimize a risk, and that what is reasonable care depends
on the severity of the risk).
222. E.g., W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921, 963
(2005).
223. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 130 (2007).
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 cmt. b (1965).
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225

It might even be reasonable for the
would probably be satisfied.
donor to feel bound by the privacy provisions of the egg donation
contract that, for the sake of the recipient couple and the child’s
226
stability and privacy, mandate contact not be made. However, if a
court decides to find a duty to warn on public policy or “risk imports
relation” grounds, it is likely it would also find that substantial effort
to warn the egg donation child is reasonable by virtue of the
227
magnitude of the pending harm.
c.

Causation

Causation is an extremely complicated factor in cases of genetic
disease because, by definition, the plaintiff is born with the disease228
bearing genes in question. Consequently, the egg donor’s failure to
229
Yet, to make a prima
warn neither causes nor changes anything.
facie case for negligence the egg donation child must prove he would
be healthy but for the egg donor’s negligent failure to warn him of
230
Logically, this threshold requirement can
her hereditary disease.
225. The egg donation agency and the fertility clinic that facilitated the egg
donation process are bound by a fiduciary and medical confidentiality duty to all
parties. See, e.g., Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 268 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
surrogacy agency served as a broker between the parties, and therefore had a
fiduciary duty to protect the parties). In adoption situations, disclosure of the
identity of the biological parents is actionable if there is a state statute that closes
adoption records, or if disclosure breaches the duty of medical confidentiality. Cf.
Humphers, 696 P.2d at 530–36 (analyzing an invasion of privacy claim against a doctor
who disclosed the biological mother’s identity to the daughter, who was relinquished
through adoption, and holding that breach of confidentiality controlled in the
circumstances, but not deciding whether informing the daughter constituted breach
when she was a party to the birth).
226. The donor may subject herself to liability if she breaches the privacy
provisions in the egg donation contract, but neither courts, scholars, nor
practitioners have yet analyzed this question. But see Squillace, supra note 220, at
146–47 (arguing for application of contract law principles to egg donation contract
issues).
227. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965) (indicating that what is
reasonable in a given set of circumstances can be determined by legislative or
administrative action; by a court applying a legislative or administrative action; by a
prior judicial decision; or, in the absence of any such legislative, judicial, or
administrative action, by the trial judge or jury looking at the facts of the case).
228. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 58, at 13–14 (describing the complication the
issue of causation presents in preconception tort liability cases as the “paradox of
offspring harm”).
229. See Denbo, supra note 201, at 577 n.70 (distinguishing the duty to warn in
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), from warning of
genetic disease because “[o]nce the patient with a genetic disorder has reproduced,
the potential harm already exists in the patient’s child,” so the notion of special
relationships articulated in the Restatement is inapplicable to genetics situations)
(citing Michelle R. King, Physician Duty To Warn a Patient’s Offspring of Hereditary
Genetic Defects: Balancing the Patient’s Right to Confidentiality Against the Family Member’s
Right To Know—Can or Should Tarasoff Apply, 4 QUINNAPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1, 31 (2000)).
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(c) (1965).
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only be met if the genetic disease in question is one that could have
been averted or mitigated through caution or preemptive medical
231
If the disease was definitely going to manifest in the child,
care.
then the failure to warn caused nothing more than a delay in
discovery of the disease. Illnesses that arise from a combination of
genetic predisposition and lifestyle choices, and are thus preventable
in some circumstances, include, for example, type II diabetes and
232
certain types of cancer. Only in these cases would a failure to warn
233
have any effect on the egg donation child’s health.
However, if poor habits and lifestyle choices can also cause the
disease, regardless of any genetic predisposition, the egg donation
child will face the evidentiary hurdle of proving his own actions did
234
Known as the
not substantially contribute to the disease’s onset.
Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, this affirmative defense
prevents recovery for injury caused by the negligent act of another
when the plaintiff’s own negligence is also a substantial cause of the
235
Some jurisdictions have rejected this “all-or-nothing”
injury.
approach in favor of a comparative fault analysis, under which the
plaintiff will recover if he is less responsible for causing his own injury
231. An example of a hereditary genetic disease that can be averted through
lifestyle choices or preemptive medical treatment is diabetes. MARIA MCCARREN, AM.
DIABETES ASS’N, A FIELD GUIDE TO TYPE 2 DIABETES 4–8 (2004). Type II diabetes can
potentially develop in anyone, but is frequently caused by strong hereditary
predispositions coupled with unhealthy lifestyle choices. Id. So, if the egg donor
finds out she is diabetic twenty years after donating eggs, her failure to warn her
genetic offspring could easily result in the egg donation child not taking preventative
dietary and exercise measures to avoid developing diabetes himself. See, e.g., Denbo,
supra note 201, at 565–71 (describing the various types of genetic tests and noting
that testing positive for a genetic predisposition does not mean one will become ill in
later life).
232. For example, diabetes is a disease resulting from the body’s underproduction (type 1) or misuse (type 2) of insulin, a hormone that is essential for the
conversion of sugar into energy. MCCARREN, supra note 231. Though the exact
cause is unknown, both genetic predispositions and environmental factors, including
poor diet and obesity, are known to contribute to the development of adult-onset
diabetes. Id. The disease is frequently fatal because of complications, such as
diabetic eye disease, and nerve and kidney damage. Id.
233. Cf. Robertson, supra note 58, at 15 (“A key point about the paradox of nonwrongful life is that the person could not have been born without the condition of
concern. If so, refusing the act or omission that causes the child to be born with that
condition cannot harm the child. Of course, if changes in technique or treatment
protocols could reduce the frequency of the condition, there would be an obligation
to adopt those changes. However, in situations in which no improvement can be
made one cannot show that the child has been harmed as a result.”).
234. See, e.g., 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 797 (2007) (“Contributory negligence is
the breach of the duty of the plaintiff to exercise due care for his or her own safety in
respect of the occurrence about which he or she complains, and if the plaintiff’s
failure to exercise due care for his or her own safety is one of the proximate
contributing causes of his or her injury, it will bar recovery.”).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 477 (1965).
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236

As the donor will assert contributory or
than the defendant.
comparative negligence as an affirmative defense, she will have the
burden of proving the child did not take reasonable steps to protect
237
The egg donation child will have the burden to
his own health.
prove his condition would have been avoidable or treatable if he had
known about his genetic predisposition at the time the egg donor
238
learned of her disease.
More practically, the child may not have access to information
needed to prove causation, because the donor’s medical
confidentiality interest might be deemed weightier than the child’s
239
need for discovery.
In adoption situations, children are generally
granted access to their biological parents’ medical information for
240
good cause.
This is a balancing test that weighs the relative
241
Even life or death needs for medical
interests of the parties.
information may not suffice to establish good cause if the likelihood
or size of the benefit is less than the public policy interest in medical
242
confidentiality. Conversely, one court has held that a sperm donor
is not a patient of a sperm bank, so medical confidentiality does not
243
apply.
However, because egg donation is so much more
complicated than sperm donation, and requires considerable medical
244
oversight, it is very unlikely a court would hold that an egg donor is
not a patient of her fertility clinic. Therefore, the egg donor is

236. 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 954 (2007).
237. See id. § 940 (stating that a defendant raising the defense of contributory
negligence must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff failed to
exercise due care).
238. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965) (“The burden of proof
that the tortious conduct of the defendant has caused the harm to the plaintiff is
upon the plaintiff.”).
239. See, e.g., In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614, 621–23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (balancing
privacy interests against the adoptee’s need to obtain medical information about his
biological parents in order to find a bone marrow donor, and deciding the
unlikelihood of finding a match rendered the adoptee’s interest less compelling than
the parent’s privacy interest).
240. See, e.g., id. (analyzing whether the adoptee has shown good cause to access
his biological parents’ records).
241. See, e.g., id. at 621 (“What is to be balanced then is the factual need and the
policy against disclosure.”).
242. Id.
243. Johnson v. Cal. Cryobank, Inc., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 872, 879 (App. Ct. 2000)
(ordering disclosure by a sperm bank of a donor’s records because the donor was not
a patient of the sperm bank).
244. See, e.g., Katers, supra note 62, at 447–48 (describing some of the
inconveniences and dangers present in egg donation that are not present in sperm
donation); Wancata, supra note 22, at 221 (contrasting the time and effort
commitments of egg donation and sperm donation to explain why sperm donors
make as little as $45 compared to the $5,000 compensation paid to egg donors).
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entitled to medical confidentiality, which may prevent the egg
donation child from proving that the donor was negligent.
Given the difficulty of proving causation, it is more likely an egg
donation child would bring suit against the egg donation agency and
245
fertility clinic for failure to adequately screen egg donors. In other
words, it may be an insurmountable hurdle for the child to prove
causation in an action against the donor for negligent failure to warn.
However, because the magnitude of the injury is great, and the egg
donor is the only person who could possibly have warned the child, it
is nonetheless possible a court would impose liability on the donor on
public policy grounds.
d.

Injury

As a logical outgrowth of the difficulty of proving causation,
determining whether the egg donation child has suffered an injury
246
presents metaphysical as well as legal complications. The recipient
parents cannot bring a wrongful birth claim because the alleged
failure to warn occurred after their choice to conceive, but the egg
247
donation child may bring a wrongful life action, though proving
injury will usually be impossible. Certainly, if the egg donor has
caused nothing by failing to warn her offspring, she also cannot have
caused any injury. More specifically, if the child’s genetic disease was
248
present at birth, even in latent form, it is not an injury at all. As the
egg donation child is born with the defective gene, his claim is, in

245. This is because a failure to adequately screen a donor is more easily proven
than a failure to warn, by virtue of the elevated duty of care the doctors are held to.
See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1992);
Part II.B.1.a (explaining the special doctor-patient relationship that creates an
elevated duty of care).
246. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, Obesity Policy Choices: Obesity and the Struggle Within
Ourselves, 3 GEO. L.J. 1335, 1357–58 (2005) (discussing the considerable obstacle
presented by the element of causation in failure to warn actions brought against food
manufacturers and providers about the danger of weight gain, cardiovascular disease
and diabetes).
247. A wrongful life claim is brought by or on behalf of the child, while a wrongful
birth claim is brought by the parent for the loss of the choice not to conceive or to
terminate the pregnancy. E.g., Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995)
(distinguishing a wrongful birth action brought by the parent when medical
negligence has deprived her of preventing or terminating the pregnancy from a
wrongful life action brought by the child who argues that it would be better were he
not alive and thus he should be compensated for having to be so).
248. See, e.g., Suter, supra note 18, at 1881 (discussing whether an injury can arise
from a family member’s disclosure of a genetic disorder to another family member,
and noting “[t]heir relatives have no risk of becoming carriers; they only have the risk
of find out that they are carriers”).
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effect, that he should recover the difference between a life without
249
the defective gene and his actual life.
Courts have handled “wrongful life” cases carefully for this
250
reason.
They usually decline to hold that life with a disability is
worth less than life without one, and thus they deny recovery for
249. As a further complication, calculating damages would require a court’s brave
metaphysical determination of the value of life with a genetic defect versus value of
life without such a flaw. Even if the child can prove negligence, the fundamental
philosophical question remains of how one calculates damages in such a situation;
how can anyone measure the value of life unimpaired versus life with a genetic
disease? See generally Roger Brownsword, Genomic Torts: An Interest in Human Dignity
as the Basis for Genomic Torts, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 428 (2003) (describing the
impossibility of such a valuation). This task is somewhat simplified here because the
child cannot bring a wrongful life or wrongful birth action because the disease only
became known to the egg donor herself after the child had already been born to the
recipient parents. See supra Part II.B.1.c–d; see also Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711
(Minn. 2004) (finding for the parents when a doctor negligently failed to warn them
their next child might carry the same disorder as their first); Lininger v. Eisenbaum,
764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (reversing summary judgment in favor of the
doctor when he negligently misdiagnosed the patient child’s blindness as nonhereditary, and that diagnosis was relied upon by the parents in conceiving a second
child who was also blind). But see Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805 (N.J. 1999)
(calculating compensatory damages for the wrongful birth of plaintiff as the
emotional harm caused to the parents plus special medical expenses from raising an
impaired child, but not the impairment itself).
Here, the breach of the duty to warn occurs after the egg donation child’s birth.
Thus, though the similarity is limited to calculation of damages, this hypothetical
case is thus more akin to a failure to warn of a contagious disease; a doctor’s failure
to warn a patient of the transmission potential of her illness that results in the
infection of foreseeable third parties. E.g., Safer v. Estate of Pack, 667 A.2d 1188,
1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (extending a doctor’s duty to warn of a
hereditary predisposition to his patient’s children when they were easily identifiable,
because there is no “essential difference” between contagious and genetic disease
when future harm “may be averted or minimized by a timely and effective warning”).
In cases where a doctor’s failure to warn results in crippling illness, the cause of
action is more similar to standard medical malpractice than wrongful life. See Becker
v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978) (defining wrongful life, wrongful birth and
wrongful conception actions as “sound[ing] essentially in negligence or
malpractice”). Thus, because the breach in question occurs after the birth of the
child in this hypothetical situation, damages would be measured according to
standard negligence remedy principles. The remedy afforded a party alleging
negligence on the part of someone who owed them a duty of care is compensation; a
prevailing plaintiff in a negligence action recovers the amount needed to put him in
the position that he would have occupied if not for the defendant’s negligence.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1965). Compensatory damages can be
awarded for both physical injury and mental anguish. Id. § 905. If the injury
suffered results in ongoing impairment that prevents the plaintiff from engaging in
work, inter alia, he may also recover for any foreseeable future earnings lost. Id. §
910 cmt. b. So the egg donation child in this case could recover the amount needed
for medical treatment of the genetic disease he would have been able to avert had he
been warned. He would also be able to recover for his mental suffering, but the
amount would vary depending on the harm actually suffered by a given egg donation
child. See infra note 255. See generally Norton, supra note 58, at 818–43 (applying
economic damages, noneconomic damages, offsets for benefits and mitigation,
foreseeable damages, and speculative damages).
250. See supra note 247 (explaining the difference between wrongful life and
wrongful birth causes of action).
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illness or disability with which the child is born.
New York Court of Appeals:

447
In the words of the

Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have
been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly
to be left to the philosophers and the theologians. Surely the law
can assert no competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view
of the very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind
252
has placed on human life, rather than its absence.

Consequently, the egg donation child bringing this action could
only make a prima facie case for negligence if the egg donor’s
unforthcoming warning would have permitted prevention or
253
The child must be able to assert that the
mitigation of his illness.
illness is an injury because it began after his birth, rather than
claiming that his genes were defective.
It is more likely that the recipient parents could prove their own
injury. Of course, the parents’ action must overcome higher hurdles
to prove the existence of a special relationship giving rise to a duty to
warn between the egg donor and themselves because that
relationship lacks the essential genetic link present between the egg
254
donor and the egg donation child.
If they are able to prove the
duty element of negligence, however, the parents may be able to
assert that the burden of paying for the sick child is a legally
255
cognizable injury.

251. E.g., Greco, 893 P.2d at 347–48. See generally Robertson, supra note 58, at 14–19
(discussing why wrongful life actions will likely not prevail in cases in which children
are conceived through ART and are also thereby injured, such that they are born
with birth defects caused by the fertility clinic’s medical negligence).
252. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978) (explaining why New York’s
highest court refuses to allow a cause of action for wrongful life).
253. See Robertson, supra note 58, at 15 (describing the “paradox of non-wrongful
life” implicated in preconception torts claims, and recognizing that no action can lie
unless the injury is one that could have been prevented or lessened).
254. See supra Part II.B.1.a (detailing the types of relationships that have been
sufficient to establish a duty of care, including a parent-child relationship and a
doctor-patient relationship).
255. Only a few states have allowed recovery by parents for special damages
incurred as a consequence of their child being born disabled. See, e.g., Smith v. Cote,
513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986) (holding that damages are appropriate for actions for
wrongful birth for tangible losses, but not intangible losses like emotional distress);
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 808–14 (permitting
special damages for the cost of caring for the child during its minority because such
damages arise from the negligence of the defendant). See generally Robertson, supra
note 58, at 18–19 (explaining that the three states that recognize a special damages
exception to the bar on wrongful life recovery do so only because the special
damages for care of the child ends when the child reaches majority).
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2.

Defenses available to the egg donor
If the egg donation child succeeds in making a prima facie case for
negligent failure to warn, the egg donor will be able to assert both
affirmative and public policy defenses. These include contributory or
comparative negligence, assumption of risk by the recipient parents,
and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine. Additionally, the donor can
argue that the importance of protecting medical confidentiality
trumps competing interests, and that imposing liability on the
grounds of even a quasi-parental relationship opens the door to egg
donors asserting parental rights.
Whether the egg donor asserts contributory or comparative
negligence depends upon which jurisdiction the egg donation child
256
Contributory negligence is a doctrine under
brings the action in.
which the plaintiff is barred from recovery completely if he also acted
257
negligently and thereby contributed to the cause of his own injury.
Most states find this common law rule too strict, and have opted for a
comparative fault determination that allows for recovery when the
258
plaintiff’s negligence was less than the defendant’s. The defense of
comparative negligence only succeeds when the plaintiff’s own act or
259
omission substantially contributes to his injury.
In this case, the egg donor will have the burden of showing the egg
donation child’s acts or omissions are sufficiently responsible for the
development of his disease that he should not be able to impose
260
liability on her.
Evidence may include anything suggesting the
261
child did not take reasonable measures to look after his own health.
256. Only four states and the District of Columbia completely bar recovery if the
plaintiff has contributed to the negligence causing his injury. 57B AM. JUR. 2D
Negligence § 956 (2007) (Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina and Virginia).
257. Id. § 797.
258. Id. § 954.
259. For example, in Walter v. Wal-Mart Stores, a pharmacist negligently gave the
plaintiff the wrong cancer medication. 2000 ME 63, 748 A.2d 961. The plaintiff was
generally active and self-sufficient prior to taking the wrong medicine. Id. at ¶
18,
748 A.2d at 968. She took the wrong drug for three weeks, without a check-up or
blood test, and it was so strong it caused major deterioration in her condition. Id.,
748 A.2d at 968. Wal-Mart argued the plaintiff’s failure to read the prescription
bottle or to get a blood test during those three weeks contributed to the injury and
broke the chain of causation. Id. ¶ 20, 748 A.2d at 969. The court found this
argument unpersuasive because the plaintiff had no way to know the medication she
was given was not the prescribed one, so her inaction was not a substantially
contributing cause. Id. ¶ 22, 748 A.2d at 969.
260. 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 851 (2007).
261. Analogously, in a famously derided case against McDonald’s, customers
argued deceptive marketing practices caused them to eat the restaurant’s food,
become obese, and develop diabetes. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d
512, 538–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), amended complaint dismissed, No. 02 Civ. 7821, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15202 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2003), vacated in part and remanded, 396 F.3d 508
(2d Cir. 2005) (finding the plaintiffs were entitled to a greater finding of fact by the
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For example, if the disease in question is adult-onset diabetes, the egg
donor could offer evidence showing the child was obese, maintained
a poor diet, rarely had medical check-ups, and rarely exercised, all of
262
which are environmental factors in the development of the disease.
Here, the hypothetical egg donation child had a genetic
predisposition toward the disease, but no certainty it would ever
263
develop. Therefore, joint causation is at issue. If the child engaged
in habits comparable to eating McDonald’s twice a day, his diabetes
might have been sufficiently caused by his own behavior that the egg
donor’s failure to warn did not constitute a substantial factor in the
cause of his illness.
The defendant egg donor may also invoke an assumption of risk
defense. Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense when the
plaintiff, explicitly or implicitly, knowingly and voluntarily assumed
264
All reproduction creates the
the danger posed by a risky activity.
265
risk of birth defects, but genetic disease does not fall in that
category. Without a doubt, the recipient couple relied upon the
fertility clinic’s screening measures, so it cannot plausibly be asserted

district court). The plaintiffs admitted to eating McDonald’s twice a day as many as
five times a week during school. Pelman, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202, at *31–33.
Because they failed to address genetic and environmental factors, the plaintiffs failed
to “isolate the particular effect of McDonald’s foods on their obesity and other
injuries,” and could not prove causation, so the complaint was dismissed. Id.
(dismissing the complaint because “[p]laintiffs have failed . . . to draw an adequate
causal connection between their consumption of McDonald’s food and their alleged
injuries”). Quoting its previous dismissal the district court explained:
[T]o allege that McDonald’s products were a significant factor in the
plaintiffs’ obesity and health problems, the Complaint must address these
other variables and, if possible, eliminate them or show that a McDiet is a
substantial factor despite these other variables. Similarly, with regard to
plaintiffs’ health problems that they claim resulted from their obesity . . . it
would be necessary to allege that such diseases were not merely hereditary or
caused by environmental or other factors.
Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
262. The American Diabetes Association estimates that “[j]ust 30 minutes a day of
moderate physical activity, coupled with a 5–10% reduction in body weight,
produced a 58% reduction in diabetes.” Am. Diabetes Ass’n, How To Prevent
Diabetes, http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-prevention/how-to-prevent-diabetes.jsp
(last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
263. As discussed in Part II.B.1.d, if the disease was definitely going to develop, the
egg donation child could not prove causation or injury from the donor’s failure to
warn.
264. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
265. See McIntyre, supra note 20, at 543 (noting the risk of passing on genetic
disease is present in sexual reproduction, but that situation provides the parties the
opportunity to investigate the parents’ genetic make-up in advance).
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that they knowingly assumed the risk of the egg donor passing on a
266
genetic disease to their child.
Discussed in Part III.A.3, the Learned Intermediary Doctrine limits
a medical manufacturer’s duty to warn customers to informing
267
experts upon whom the consumer reasonably relies.
In this case,
both the egg donation agency and the fertility clinic are such experts,
because they posses the medical expertise and they serve both the
recipient couple and the donor in a fiduciary capacity. Thus, if the
donor informs either of the learned intermediaries, the agency or
clinic, she has probably satisfied her duty to warn the egg donation
child.
The egg donor also has at least two strong public policy arguments
in her defense. First, the issue of medical confidentiality is very much
implicated in the negligence case prospectively analyzed here. The
duty to maintain a patient’s confidence dates back as far as 400 B.C.,
268
when the Hippocratic Oath was first recorded.
Most states have
269
statutes protecting medical confidentiality. The duty of doctors to
maintain the doctor-patient privilege is necessary to ensure a
patient’s ability to speak freely and disclose all information needed
270
for treatment.
However, doctors may disclose patient information
with impunity when it is necessary to protect the public from the
271
spread of disease or to protect a patient’s family.
In sperm donation situations, the sperm donor has been held not
272
to be a patient within the meaning of the doctor-patient privilege.
273
Thus, the sperm donor is not entitled to medical confidentiality. In
contaminated blood donation cases, donors’ privacy interests are
usually considered less important than the tremendous public
266. Cf. id. at 541–43 (analyzing the defense of assumption of risk when a genetic
disease is passed from an anonymous sperm donor to a child conceived with his
sperm, and concluding that it would be unsuccessful in that situation).
267. See Kane, supra note 176 (concluding that a medical manufacturer reasonably
delegated its duty to warn to a third party who had purchased the drug).
268. See Suter, supra note 18, at 1871 (explaining that the Oath expresses a
physician’s moral obligation “to maintain confidentiality in the physician-patient
relationship”).
269. See Ralph Ruebner & Leslie Ann Reis, Hippocrates to HIPAA: A Foundation for a
Federal Physician-Patient Privilege, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 505, 507 (2004) (finding forty states
and the District of Columbia recognize the doctor-patient privilege).
270. See, e.g., Denbo, supra note 201, at 572 (discussing the history and purpose of
medical confidentiality rules).
271. See id. at 574 (noting that a majority of states mandate disclosure in the case
of child abuse or neglect, gunshot wounds or contagious diseases).
272. See, e.g., Johnson v. Super. Ct., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Ct. App. 2000) (ordering
disclosure by a sperm bank of a sperm donor’s medical records, but protecting his
identity).
273. See id. at 872 (concluding that the physician-patient privilege has no
application in the case of this sperm donor).

2008]

GUARANTORS OF OUR GENES

451
274

interest in maintaining a safe and adequate national blood supply.
Also, communicable diseases fall within the permissible exceptions to
275
doctor-patient medical confidentiality. Confidentiality is most fully
recognized in the adoption setting, where medical data of biological
276
parents can usually be accessed only upon a showing of good cause.
In this case, unlike a sperm donation situation, the egg donor is
likely a patient of the fertility clinic and egg donation agency because
of the extensive medical oversight the egg donation process
277
Therefore, she is entitled to the protection of medical
requires.
confidentiality. Further, as the child is born with the predisposition,
it is likely a court would conclude that the potential benefit to be
gained by disclosing the donor’s medical information is outweighed
278
by the donor’s interest in medical confidentiality.
A second public policy defense, and perhaps the more persuasive,
is that the egg donor can argue that imposing liability on her for a
negligent failure to warn would be contrary to the law’s preference
279
for reinforcing traditional family structures.
The argument is that
any recognition of a duty the egg donor owes the child implicitly
opens the door to claims for rights and parental privileges, and courts
have consistently favored legal fictions that protect traditional notions
280
This preference was clearly illustrated in Gerald H. v.
of family.
281
Michael D., in which the Supreme Court upheld a California statute
mandating, as an irrebuttable presumption, that a child born into

274. See Hopkins, supra note 110, at 145–46 (arguing for donor’s privacy interests
in blood donation contamination litigation).
275. See, e.g., Denbo, supra note 201, at 572 (explaining the rationale for the
doctrine of physician-patient confidentiality, but noting that a physician can reveal
confidential communications when required by law).
276. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing state regulation and case law regarding
adoption, including the circumstances in which various states allow the opening of
sealed adoption records). See generally Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Adoption,
Reproductive Technologies, and Genetic Information, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 125, 126 (1998)
(assessing whether genetic history should be available to children born through ART,
and being unable to “think of any legal reason why such information should be
disclosed,” but easily thinking “of any number of social reasons why it should not be
revealed”).
277. See supra Section II.B.1.c (reasoning that a physician assumes the duty to warn
his patient).
278. Cf. In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614, 621–23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (finding the
benefit outweighed by the biological father’s privacy interest when disclosure was
unlikely to produce a bone marrow donor match for the adoptee).
279. See, e.g., Richards & Wolf, supra note 8, at 527–34 (discussing the law’s
preference for preserving the traditional family, even though changing social and
reproductive trends render the preference a legal fiction frequently at odds with
reality).
280. See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 3, at 528–34 (analyzing cases where paternity
conflicted with presumptions of paternity).
281. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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marriage is the child of both members of the marriage, even when a
282
paternity test would definitively prove otherwise. This presumption
283
In fact, courts are usually so eager to
also exists at common law.
reinforce traditional family structures that a double standard exists
284
regarding paternity; even when a father is demonstrably not the
biological father of a child, courts may sometimes force him to pay
285
child support, yet a biological father may be denied parental rights
286
if those rights impede upon the sanctity of a traditional family. The
purpose of such paternity presumptions is to ensure that children are
287
provided for and to escape traditional notions of illegitimacy.
Here, the hypothetical egg donation child is fully provided for by
his actual, intending parents, so that impetus for holding the egg
donor to a duty of care is absent. Thus, egg donation is most like
adoption, because responsibility for the child is fully assumed by new
parents. However, even more than in an adoption case, the recipient
parents are the only parents the egg donation child has ever had,
because all the donor provided were unfertilized eggs. In fact, one
would presume that intending parents often choose ART instead of
adoption in order to have children who are more fully their own.
Therefore, the imperative in adoption, that the full legal transfer of

282. Id.
283. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 2.5 cmt. c (1998) (“A child born to a married woman is presumptively the genetic
child of the woman’s husband.”). This common law presumption was intended to
protect children from being declared illegitimate.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1
COMMENTARIES *457.
284. See Dolgin, supra note 3, at 563 (discussing the conflict between traditional
constructs of family and the realities of modern families, including those created by
multiple marriages, divorces, gay and lesbian relationships, and assisted reproductive
technologies, and noting the contradictory results this conflict creates in paternity
suit outcomes).
285. E.g., Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (applying
estoppel principles in refusing to admit DNA evidence, proving the mother’s exhusband was not the biological father of the child born during their marriage, in
order to require the ex-husband to continue paying child support, even though the
wife had instituted a child support suit against a third party). See generally Richards &
Wolf, supra note 8, at 427–34 (discussing putative and legal fathers’ rights regarding
marital children).
286. E.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (upholding a statute barring introduction of
DNA paternity tests into a custody suit when the evidence would disturb the married
couple and its traditional family structure); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)
(rejecting a biological father’s effort to block the adoption of his child by the
mother’s husband, even though she married the adopting father after the child’s
birth).
287. See Dolgin, supra note 3, at 527–28 (explaining the presumption as a way to
help children avoid hardship).
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the child creates stability and normality, is intrinsic in the egg
288
donation process itself.
Imposing a duty on the egg donor allows for the possibility that the
donor could assert rights over the egg donation child. Not only
would such a possibility directly impede the imperative of stability
and normality, but it would also buck the trend in the law favoring
289
intention as the ultimate determination of parentage. The court in
Johnson refused to conclude the child had two mothers, one
biological and one genetic:
The Calverts are the genetic and intending parents of their son
and have provided him, by all accounts, with a stable, intact, and
nurturing home. To recognize parental rights in a third party with
whom the Calvert family has had little contact since shortly after
the child’s birth would diminish Crispina [Calvert]’s role as
290
mother.

This logic should control an egg donation child’s suit against the egg
donor for failing to warn him of his genetic predisposition. Here, the
recipient parents are half the genetic parents of the child, the
intending mother is also the biological (birth) mother, and they are
291
also the intending parents. The egg donor does not even have the
biological link created by birth upon which Anna Johnson’s claim of
292
maternity was founded. Certainly, recognizing parental rights in an
egg donor rather than a gestational surrogate, an even more distant
third party, would diminish the recipient and intending parents’
293
parental status.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Notwithstanding the conclusion reached in the analysis in Part II,
above, the possibility remains that a court might hold an egg donor
liable for latent genetic diseases passed to an egg donation child after
finding either that eggs are commodities, and thus the donor is a
seller, or that there is a special relationship between the donor and
288. Cf. Anderson, supra note 83, at 610–11 (“Adoption statutes are very clear
regarding the termination of birth parents’ legal rights and responsibilities.”);
Manning, supra note 14, at 711–16 (discussing an adoptee’s entitlement to stability
through clear legal parentage determination).
289. See Dolgin, supra note 3, at 542 (describing the courts’ justification for
protecting traditional family structures because families are “moral units” in need of
protection).
290. 851 P.2d 776, 781 n.8 (Cal. 1993).
291. This genetic ratio assumes the intending father’s sperm was used to fertilize
the donor’s egg, though the sperm may well be from an anonymous donor as well.
292. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779 (stating that Anna Johnson gave birth to the child).
293. Id. at 781 n.8 (arguing that there is no reason to accept that a child has two
mothers in this situation).
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the child creating a duty to warn. It is critical that the type of
litigation analyzed in this Comment be preempted by proper
legislation, and that the free-for-all that defines the egg donation
294
Thus, following a discussion of the various
industry be reined in.
interests in need of protection, this section proposes comprehensive
regulation.
The competing interests are varied. Regulation should protect egg
donors, recipient parents, and the children born from donated eggs.
In opposition to a donor’s privacy interest, the children born with
donated eggs must be assisted in the treatment and prevention of
disease through access to the medical records of their donor
295
parent. Egg donation children must also be guaranteed protection
against genetic diseases they cannot avoid through stringent
screening measures that filter out donors who carry genetic
296
Donors must be sure anonymity will be preserved and
diseases.
must be confident they will never be found to be the lawful parents of
297
any children their eggs may ultimately create.
On the flip side,
intending parents and their families need protection from the
298
possible intrusion of an egg donor asserting parental rights.
First, to protect egg donation children, the possibility of birth with
a genetic disease should be minimized by adoption of strict screening
294. Calls for regulation are not new. See Anderson, supra note 83, at 620–26,
(proposing comprehensive legislation to govern ART); Horstmeyer, supra note 63, at
693 (proposing a rule requiring a birth mother to state before the procedure that
she does not wish gamete donors to have parental rights over the child); Katers, supra
note 62, at 466 (arguing for “nuclear-family traditionalism” for ART legislation);
Squillace, supra note 220, at 146–50 (applying contract and property law principles to
egg donation regulation). But see Baum, supra note 13, at 162–66 (arguing free
market principles should govern egg donation instead of restrictive regulation to
maximize procreative liberty and recognition of freedom of contract). Students at
the University of Iowa drafted a model ART Act in 2005. Sara Cotton et al., Model
Assisted Reproductive Technology Act, 9 GENDER RACE & JUST. 55, 55 (2005). The
American Bar Association has also published model ART guidelines. MODEL ACT
GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 1 (Proposed Draft 2006) (revised 2007).
295. For calls for full access to sperm and egg donors’ medical information, see
Baines, supra note 17, at 118–20 (balancing the child’s right to know his own genetic
background with the donor’s right to anonymity and the recipient parent’s right to
have the fact of assisted reproduction kept secret, and arguing for the same access
extended to adoptees to be extended to children born of donated eggs or sperm);
D’Orazio, supra note 17, at 253 (arguing for access to medical records given the
importance of such information for making health decisions).
296. See Robertson, supra note 58, at 10–11 (describing the risk of transmission of
genetic disease without proper screening).
297. For a discussion of the danger of being found to be a lawful parent faced by
egg donors, see Crews, supra note 44, at 154 (critiquing K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.2d 673
(Cal. 2005)).
298. Cf. In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (permitting the biological father
of a child conceived with his donated sperm to seek parental rights when he and the
mother might have agreed not to extinguish his parental rights).
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standards for egg donors.
Currently, the Food and Drug
Administration requires that donors undergo a basic blood test for
299
A limited number of states also have
communicable diseases.
300
screening requirements that are limited to communicable diseases.
Furthermore, to best protect egg donation children, they should have
the same access to the genetic information of their egg donors that
adoptees have to their biological parents’ information for good
301
cause.
Second, egg donors must be protected against product liability
actions by classification of human eggs as non-products. Just as blood
shield statutes have blocked such actions in the context of blood
donation, egg donors should not be held to the high standards of
302
product liability.
Blood shield statutes permit actions for
negligence and misrepresentation, and egg donation law should as
303
Furthermore, donors must also be confident they will never
well.
be found responsible for parental duties.
Most importantly, the duty of care should be placed squarely onto
the egg donation agencies and fertility clinics. These companies
304
profit tremendously from ART. They possess the medical expertise,
they solicit infertile couples who want their own children, and they
305
serve as brokers between and agents for the parties. Therefore, the
burden of screening donors for hereditary genetic disease and
selecting embryos free from genetic defects properly belongs to the
egg donation agencies and fertility clinics. Though critics of
extensive pre-donation genetic screening might argue the cost would

299. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting the minimal regulation of
donor screening in most jurisdictions).
300. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:14 (2007) (“No gamete shall be used in
an in vitro fertilization or preembryo transfer procedure, unless the gamete donor
has been medically evaluated and the results, documented in accordance with rules
adopted by the division of public health services, demonstrate the medical
acceptability of the person as a gamete donor.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-45.3 (2007)
(“Any person using donor gametes . . . [for] artificial insemination, in vitro
fertilization, . . . or other intervening medical technology using sperm or ova, shall,
prior to using any donor gametes for such procedures, ascertain the HIV status of
the donor through testing as provided in Board of Health regulations.”).
301. See Manning, supra note 14, at 716 (“Even those states that do not allow
complete access to adoption records recognize the importance of access to genetic
medical history . . . .”).
302. See Part I.D.4 (discussing blood shield statutes, and noting their possible
applicability to other human tissue, including gametes).
303. Id.
304. Cf. MUNDY, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that pharmaceutical companies make
approximately $3,000,000,000 per year from sales of fertility drugs and medical
devices used in ART procedures).
305. Cf. Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 270 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding a surrogacy
agency to a fiduciary duty of care).
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be prohibitive, an intending couple that is already paying over
$20,000 to have a child of their own would likely consider ensuring
that child’s future health warrants this precautionary step.
Regardless, egg donors, who are arguably the least informed party in
an egg donation transaction, should not be forced to bear burdens of
306
care they are ill equipped to meet.
Given all these competing interests, states should adopt the revised
2002 Uniform Parentage Act provision that specifically bars
307
recognition of gamete donors as legal parents, and should add
additional provisions to protect the other interests at play. First, the
UPA provision that should be adopted states that “[a] donor is not a
308
parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”
Adoption of this provision would protect the donor, the intending
parents, and the egg donation child by preserving the family
structure from multiple and conflicting parental claims.
Second, the additional regulation should include a statute
modeled on the adoption statutes that grant access to parents’
medical information, without revealing the parents’ identities, upon a
309
showing of good cause.
Consequently, states should also adopt
regulation that requires adequate record keeping of egg donors’
medical information by the egg donation agencies and fertility clinics
so that egg donation children can access their genetic histories if and
when they show good cause.
Third, states should adopt regulation that specifically classifies egg
donation as a service, thereby preventing invocation of the UCC or
product liability law by plaintiff egg donation children.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, high minimum screening
standards should be also mandated, with the duty and burden of care
placed on the skilled shoulders of the egg donation agencies and
310
With this genetic
fertility clinics so all parties are protected.
information available before the egg donation process commences,
intending parents should also be able to—and required to—give truly
informed consent, waiving the liability of the donor for any future
306. See supra Part II.A.1 (critiquing the idea of applying principles of product
liability as a means of imposing a duty to warn on egg donors).
307. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
See supra Part I.C. (providing further information about the history and current state
of the UPA).
308. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702.
309. See supra Part I.D.2 (noting the circumstances in which sealed adoption
records may be opened).
310. This could, perhaps, take the form of amendments to the Fertility Clinic
Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992. 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). See supra note 12
and accompanying text (discussing the frequency and success rates of IVF).
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311

Critically, this
medical issues faced by the egg donation child.
regulation should prohibit egg donation procedures and transactions
unless licensed medical professionals—the fertility clinics—have
conducted threshold screening for latent genetic disorders.
CONCLUSION
Infertility is a tragedy that affects a considerable percentage of the
312
population.
ARTs offer a solution for an increasing number of
people, but the legal, ethical and practical consequences have not yet
been worked out. Currently, the near absolute lack of regulation
necessarily turns every case in which egg donation is at issue into an
313
Thus far, the question of
ad hoc determination of parentage.
whether the anonymous egg donors, whose eggs permit so many
parents to have children, retain an ongoing duty of care to protect
their offspring has not been answered. As this Comment has argued,
legislation must be passed to protect egg donors from being held to a
continuing duty to warn. Statutes that balance the competing
interests in play should preempt suits similar to the hypothetical
action analyzed here. Most importantly, the egg donation industry,
and the fertility industry in general, desperately needs regulating so
that a situation in which an egg donation child is born with disease or
defective gene does not ever arise.

311. For a discussion of informed consent in egg donation situations, see Barbara
L. Atwell, The Modern Age of Informed Consent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 591 (2006)
(addressing the parameters of informed consent in the new situations alternative
reproductive medical procedures present).
312. CDC, SUCCESS RATES, supra note 33, at 1 (reporting that fifteen percent of
American women will seek infertility treatment in their lives).
313. E.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (using parental intent
as a tiebreaker between a birth and genes to determine parentage).

